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Pro gradu-tutkielmassani tutkin sitä, luovatko yritysostot arvoa ostajayhtiölle pitkällä aikavälillä 
osakkeen hintakehityksen kautta. Tuoreessa julkaisemattomassa artikkelissaan, Malmendier, 
Moretti, ja Peters (2014) ehdottavat, että yrityskauppakilpailun hävinneen osapuolen osakkeen 
hintakehityksen käyttäminen kuvaamaan ostajayhtiön osakkeen odotettua kehitystä, mikäli 
yrityskauppaa ei olisi tapahtunut, olisi lähempänä osakkeen hypoteettista hintakehitystä. Tutkijat 
perustelevat tätä sillä, että yrityskauppakilpailun voittaja ja häviäjä ovat todennäköisesti enemmän 
samankaltaisia keskenään ja niihin myös kohdistuvat todennäköisemmin samankaltaiset 
markkinaodotukset kuin aikasemmin käytettyihin verrokkeihin.  
   Malmendierin, Morettin, ja Petersin (2014) tuloksen viittaavat merkittävään ostajayhtiön arvon 
heikkenemiseen pitkällä aikavälillä. Tässä tutkimuksessa sekä testaan että analysoin kriittisesti 
tutkijoiden saamia tuloksia. Näin ollen tämä tutkimus on tärkeä validoimaan tutkijoiden 
poikkeavia tuloksia sekä tarkastelemaan heidän lähestymistapaansa pitkän aikavälin 
performanssin määrittämiseen. Arvioidessani fuusioiden ja yritysostojen pitkän aikavälin 
vaikutusta, käytän event study ja calendar-time – tutkimusmenetelmiä. 
   Tutkimusaineistoni koostuu 93 yhdysvaltalaisesta yrityskauppakilpailusta, sisältäen aina yhden 
yrityskauppakilpailun voittajan ja häviäjän. Yrityskaupat tapahtuivat kesäkuun 1985 ja 
maaliskuun 2012 välisenä aikana. Otokseen ei sisälly yrityskauppoja, joissa voittajan ja häviäjän 
ostotarjouksia ei ole tehty päällekkäisinä ajanjaksoina. Tämän lisäksi yrityskauppakilpailun 
voittajalla ja häviäjällä on oltava yhtenäiset mahdollisuudet voittaa tarjouskilpailu. 
Aineisto julkisista ostotarjouksista on kerätty SDC -tietokannasta. Lisäksi käytän CRSP ja 
COMPUSTAT -tietokantoja osakkeiden hintakehitys- ja tilinpäätöstietoja kuvaavan aineiston 
hankkimiseen. Kenneth Frenchin tietokannasta olen kerännyt tiedot keskimääräisistä 
toimialatuotoista. 
Tulokseni tuovat lisäarvoa fuusioita ja yritysostoja koskevaan aikaisempaan kirjallisuuteen ja 
niillä on myös merkitystä käytännön elämään. Tulokset osoittavat, että yrityskaupan tekeminen ei 
ole ostajayhtiölle haitallista, mutta se ei myöskään paranna yhtiön performanssia pitkällä 
aikavälillä. Saamani tulokset ovat pitäviä kontrolloituani fuusioihin ja yritysostoihin liittyviä 
tekijöitä, jotka voivat mahdollisesti vääristää tuloksia koskien itse yrityskaupan vaikutusta 
ostajayhtiön performanssiin. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation of the study 
The year 2015 was a record-breaking year for global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
pushing the total deal value to US$4.28 trillion, and beating the previous record set in 2007, 
right before the financial crisis (UNCTAD).1 Companies seek an M&A transaction for 
various company-specific reasons, of which most common being an attempt to grow the 
business either through obtaining new products or technology, expanding into new 
geographical areas, getting access to a new customer base, and capturing synergistic benefits. 
However, expanding too aggressively may be detrimental, and one popular view is that the 
majority of mergers are highly unprofitable to the acquirers. Reflecting this worry, the share 
price of an acquiring company has a tendency to fall right after an M&A announcement. 
Mergers and acquisitions have been and will be a popular topic among researchers, since 
regardless of the previous empirical results; unanimity is yet to be reached on the fundamental 
question of whether or not mergers increase the wealth of the acquiring company. The 
previous empirical studies have predominantly focused on short-term returns when measuring 
the value creation impact of a merger on the acquirer (see e.g. Asquith, 1983; Bradley et al., 
1988; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Agrawal et al., 1992). The long-term impact on the acquirer 
has been studied to a lesser extent. The long-run return studies are somewhat new and so far 
academics have mostly reported negative abnormal returns post-merger2. It is suggested that 
the negative performance could be associated with transaction characteristics, such as the 
payment method (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Malmendier et al. 
2014), or the public status of the target (Chang, 1998; Faccio et al. 2006). 
The reason for examining short-term rather than long-term returns when assessing M&A 
effect could be explained by several challenges to be faced when estimating long-term 
abnormal returns. It is challenging to select a proper benchmark for an acquirer representing 
its stock returns over long-term in the absence of the merger. Thus, a common practice has 
been simply to compare the companies that merge to those that do not without taking into 
account that the acquirers represent a selected sample, unlike the random control group. The 
                                                 
1 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-database.aspx 
2 See e.g. Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983), Agrawal et al. (1992), Mitchell and Stafford 
(1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), and Savor and Lu (2009) 
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endogeneity of the acquisition decision should be considered, since it could be the case that 
companies pursuing M&A deals are the most overvalued companies in the market, as 
predicted by the market-timing theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Savor and Lu, 2009). 
Hence, assuming that the returns of acquirers in the absence of the merger would have 
performed similarly as an average company in the market may not be true. If the stock price 
of a company is above its fundamental value, it is expected to decline eventually, and hence 
the observed poor post-merger performance in comparison to the matched company could 
solely reflect the market correction to the overvaluation and not indicate the true merger 
effect.   
One of the most well-known M&A blunders of all time is the merger between America 
Online and Time Warner that was executed during the dotcom bubble3.  However, it could be 
that in the absence of the stock deal, America Online would have performed even worse in 
terms of stock returns. Shleifer and Vishny (2003, p. 295) suggest: ”From our perspective, the 
central feature of this (America Online and Time Warner) acquisition is not technological 
synergies, but rather the attempt by the management of the overvalued America Online to buy 
the hard assets of Time Warner to avoid even worse returns in the long run.” Hence, when 
evaluating the causal effect of the merger and the ultimate benefits to the acquirer, it is 
essential to take into account the measurable omitted variables that could bias the estimates, 
such as payment method (e.g. stock-deal), and to have credible estimates of the returns that 
would have been generated to the acquirer in the absence of the merger.  
In a recent working paper, Malmendier et al. (2014) offer an improvement to the previously 
employed control groups regarding stock performance. The researchers use the data on 
merger contests and compare acquirers’ (winners) post-merger performance to that of 
unsuccessful bidders (losers) to better address the identification issue. Accordingly, it is likely 
that the merger contest winner and loser are more similar than simply comparing the winner 
to an average company in the market, in that sense that they have both selected the strategy to 
grow inorganically and are pursuing the same target. In their paper, Malmendier et al. (2014) 
find evidence of significant long-term acquirer value disruption. The researchers examine 
long-term abnormal return performance of acquirers and show that the acquirers 
underperform the losers by approximately 50% over the following three years. Malmendier et 
al. (2014) suggest that the finding could be related to the payment method. However, unlike 
                                                 
3 To obtain more information on America Online and Time Warner merger, I refer to 
http://fortune.com/2015/01/10/15-years-later-lessons-from-the-failed-aol-time-warner-merger/ 
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majority of the financial studies, Malmendier et al. (2014) argue that carrying out a stock-
deal, rather than a cash-deal, would lead to a better long-term abnormal performance. 
1.2 Main findings 
In this thesis the objective is to empirically examine whether mergers create or destroy 
acquirer value by employing a novel methodology similar to the one used by Malmendier et 
al. (2014) applied to a sample composed of merger contests including 93 sets of acquirer and 
unsuccessful bidder pairs. The U.S. mergers in the sample have been completed after a merger 
contest during the time period between 1985 and 2012. In assessing the value impact, I use 
both the event-time and calendar time methodologies, and the improved benchmarks 
(unsuccessful bidders), suggested by Malmendier (2014), to detect long-term abnormal 
returns. 
Contrary to the findings of Malmendier et al. (2014), I do not find evidence of consistent post-
merger value disruption, whereas the results are highly sensitive to the selected expected 
return benchmark in terms of both statistical significance and magnitude. Therefore it cannot 
be concluded that carrying out a merger would negatively affect long-term post-merger 
performance. My results are robust across the transaction characteristics, measurable omitted 
variables, such as method of payment, target size, etc., that could potentially bias the 
estimates. However, it should be noted that even though the sample size used in this study is 
larger than the one employed by Malmendier et al. (2014), it is still restricted and this may 
have an impact on the results. The small sample size may partly explain the differences in the 
results between this study and the one of Malmendier et al. (2014), as the results conducted 
using a small sample size are likely to be more sensitive to the changes in the sample. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the small sample size Malmendier et al. (2014) do not examine 
the data for extreme values, unlike I did. 
With respect to cash-financed acquisitions I do not find that they would be associated with the 
negative acquirer post-merger performance as suggested by Malmendier et al. (2014). 
Moreover, I do not find evidence of stock-deals being value disruptive either, which is 
contrary to typically reported findings in the U.S. studies (see, e.g. Asquith, 1983; Huang and 
Walking, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997, and Dong et al., 2006).  
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1.3 Research problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine acquirer long-term abnormal returns by using a 
benchmark that is likely to be more similar with the acquirers than the previously used 
benchmarks, such as the average company in the market. Hence, using this novel approach of 
Malmendier et al. (2014), I am able to address the problems related to the unobservable 
characteristics that the prior literature was unable to resolve. Thus in this thesis the 
endogeneity of the acquisition decision is also taken into account by limiting data to merger 
contests and treating the contest losers as a valid control group. 
In this thesis I limit the data to the U.S. mergers contest, and examine the subsequent long-
term value impact of a merger on the acquirer. Hence, I form my research question as follows: 
Research question: Do mergers create value for acquirers in terms of long-term 
abnormal returns? 
1.4 Contribution to the existing literature 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by testing whether the winners significantly 
underperform the contest losers in the long-term, and if the size of the underperformance is 
close to the findings reported by Malmendier et al. (2014). In this thesis I critically evaluate 
the validity of the results of Malmendier et al. (2014) and consider the applicability of their 
approach to detect long-term abnormal returns. The approach used in the study of Malmendier 
et al. (2014) differs from the conventional statistical methods in employing the merger contest 
losers as a valid control group. Moreover, the results of Malmendier et al. (2014) are 
inconsistent with the existing financial literature, showing that extreme value disruption 
related to a merger. This thesis provides an essential robustness check for their novel and yet 
untested findings. 
I also test the argument of Malmendier et al. (2014) which claims that cash-deals would be 
more value disruptive compared to stock-deals. The finding is inconsistent with the previous 
literature (see, e.g. Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Faccio and Masulis, 2005) and it should be 
tested. The sample used in this study could be deemed as more reliable than the one used by 
Malmendier et al. (2014), because it covers a more recent and longer period of time, and is 
also larger in size.  
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To conclude, with this thesis I test the findings of Malmendier et al. (2014), but also bring 
more insight into the long-term abnormal post-merger studies, as every additional study sheds 
more light to the merger effect and the related value creation or disruption. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Section 2 of this paper, an introduction of the 
previous literature and methodology used in the long-term abnormal return studies is 
presented. The data and the employed methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
provides an analysis of the results, including the result of the robustness checks. Section 5 
compares the findings of this thesis to those of Malmendier et al. (2014), and also relates the 
findings of this study to the broader financial literature. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
thesis. 
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2 Previous research 
In this section, I first go through the theories regarding motivation and effects of M&A. After 
that I present what the prior literature states on M&A value creation in terms of long-term 
abnormal returns and which transaction characteristics could affect the value creation or 
disruption. In this thesis I focus solely on acquirer returns and hence do not discuss value 
creation for target shareholders4 in this chapter. For readers unfamiliar with the M&A 
terminology I refer to Appendix A.  
2.1 Theories regarding motivation and effects of M&A 
In general, financial theories suggest that M&A activities can be carried out for several 
reasons. Some of the most common theories predicting value disruptive mergers are the ones 
related to manager’s overconfidence and self-interest, and the free cash flow theory. But there 
are also theories suggesting that managers try to time the market and may end up increasing 
the company value with this practice. 
Market timing theory 
The idea in the market timing theory is that the decision whether or not to issue equity 
depends on the share price performance (see, e.g., Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk et 
al., 1992). The market timing refers to a practice of issuing company shares at high prices and 
buying them back at low prices. The purpose is to take advantage of the temporary 
fluctuations in the cost of equity (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Hence, managers have an 
incentive to try to time the market if they think that the company share price is either 
undervalued or overpriced. According to the market-timing theory, if a corporate manager 
perceives that the company share price is overvalued, they could carry out a merger to replace 
their overvalued equity to hard assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, and Savor and Lu, 2009). 
Manager’s overconfidence (hubris) and self-interest 
It is intriguing that while numerous studies argue that acquisitions are in the interest of 
shareholders as they are associated with a value creating effect (e.g. market power, efficiency, 
asset redeployment, and market discipline); there is also a school of completely opposite 
view. According to this scholar, acquisitions are value-destroying as managers are interested 
                                                 
4 To obtain insights into value effects of M&A targets, I refer to the papers by e.g. Langetieg (1978), Healy et al. 
(1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and DeLong (2001). 
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in maximizing their own well-being. Roll (1986) argues that management of an acquiring 
company may exhibit hubris (overconfidence) when undergoing a takeover. Unlike agency-
problem, the problem of CEO exhibiting hubris is not mitigated by using a compensation 
package. In accordance with the hubris theory, the managers would rather pay with cash than 
equity as they perceive that market undervalues the value of the company (Roll, 1986). 
Agrawal & Walkling (1994) have found a link between management compensation and 
acquisitive behaviour. The paper puts on evidence that industries having higher CEO 
compensation are more active in acquisitions than industries with more moderate 
compensations. As by increasing the size of the company, the bonuses are also likely to 
increase. According to agency theory, compensation contracts should be created so that 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests are in line. However, there is a lot of evidence that 
desire for bigger salary is strong and self-serving motivations are occasionally determining 
factors in acquisition decision. Consistent with this notion the acquiring CEO’s compensation 
usually increases after the acquisition in terms of equity-based payments, bonuses, and other 
compensations regardless of the acquisition performance (e.g. Bliss and Rosen, 2001; 
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007).  
Free cash flow theory 
The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) suggests that managers endowed with free cash 
flow will rather choose to undergo negative net present value (NPV) projects than to pay cash 
out to shareholders. Jensen defines free cash flow as the cash flow exceeding the amount 
needed to fund all the available positive NPV investments. The free cash flow hypothesis 
indicates that agency costs are great for a cash-rich firm that has already exhausted positive 
NPV projects as it rather tends to move forward with negative NPV projects than to distribute 
cash out to shareholders (Lang et al., 1991). 
Efficient market hypothesis 
According to the efficient-market hypothesis of Fama (1970), the stock prices of publicly 
traded companies should instantly react to the introduction of a new event. The entire 
valuation effect, the expected net present value of the costs and benefits related to the event, 
should be incorporated into the stock price at the time of the announcement. Hence, stock 
prices are considered to reveal investors’ perceptions of future performance of a company as 
well as its level of risk. Accordingly, no long-term abnormal returns should occur, and 
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subsequently no anomalies should be able to be recognized. According to Fama (1998, p. 
284): “most long-term return anomalies can reasonably be attributed to chance.” Fama (1998) 
support this view by stating the long term return is highly sensitive to methodology, and 
anomalies tend to vanish when used different benchmarks for normal returns.  
Although, testing whether or not efficient market hypothesis holds is challenging as Campbell 
et al. (1997, p. 249) state, "First, any test of efficiency must assume an equilibrium model that 
defines normal security returns. If efficiency is rejected, this could be because the market is 
truly inefficient or because an incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed. This joint 
hypothesis problem means that market efficiency as such can never be rejected." 
2.2 Long-term post-merger studies 
Methodology 
With respect to long-term abnormal studies, there is considerable variation in the measures 
and statistical tests. Barber and Lyon (1997) examine the empirical power and specification of 
test statistics employed to detect long-term abnormal stock returns. The sample of Baber and 
Lyon (1997) comprises a sample of companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, 
during the period between July 1963 and December 1994. According to the authors, long-run 
abnormal return should be calculated using the buy-and-hold return methodology and use an 
appropriate benchmark for expected returns.  
The advantage of using the BHAR methodology lies in its ability to accurately measure 
investor experience from buying and holding securities over a certain time period, and 
therefore the methodology is more suitable in examining long-term performance compared to 
cumulative abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) document that with the same sample 
they report zero annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to market benchmark. 
However, when using a corresponding 12-month a mean cumulative abnormal return 
methodology, they find a positive long-term return of 5%, on average. Hence, if using a 
cumulative abnormal return methodology in estimating long-term performance, it is possible 
to conclude that long-term return is generated, even in fact that would not be the case.  No 
wonder that BHAR is regarded as a standard approach to test long-run abnormal returns. 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000, p. 296) describe BHARs as, “the average multiyear return from a 
strategy of investing in all firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a prespecified 
holding period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar nonevent firms.”  
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Long-term abnormal returns 
Mandelker (1974) was one of first academics to examine acquirer long-term abnormal 
performance related to a merger. Based on his results, conducted using a U.S. data set of 241 
companies that completed a merger during the period of 1941-1963, acquirers are associated 
with an abnormal return of -1.32%. The results giving more support on the view of value 
disruption are the ones reported by Langetieg (1978). He shows that acquirers are likely to be 
affected even more severely by the mergers. Langetieg (1978) suggest the impact of a merger 
on the acquirer is -6.59% over long-term. 
Asquith (1983) and Agrawal et al. (1992) also report negative abnormal returns for acquiring 
firms up to five years post-announcement. Asquith (1983) examines the effect of merger bids 
on stock returns using U.S. data and a sample of 196 successful bids and 89 unsuccessful bids 
announced between 1962 and 1976. Asquith (1983) reports that the long-term abnormal 
return of -7.20% is generated to the successful bidders, whereas the unsuccessful bidders face 
even worse abnormal return of -9.60%. Hence, it would come with a cost not being able to 
close a deal after announcing a bid. The results are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Agrawal et al. (1992) investigate 765 U.S. acquirers and find that acquirers carrying out a 
merger are associated with a negative long-term abnormal return of 10.26%, the finding being 
statistically significant at the 5% level. However, this negative abnormal return is only related 
to merger, the researchers report that tender offers post-acquisition performance is not 
statistically different from zero. 
One of the studies suggesting that mergers are, in fact, beneficial to the acquirer, is the paper 
of Loderer and Martin (1992). They have a comprehensive data set of 1,298 U.S. completed 
mergers and tender offers. Based on their results, acquirers earn a positive long-term 
abnormal return of 1.5% post-merger. On the contrary, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) support the 
finding of Agrawal et al. (1992) finding that the post-acquisition returns are negative (-4%) 
for mergers but positive (+9%) for tender offers. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) have a sample of 
3,968 completed mergers and 348 tender offers. 
Having also a comprehensive sample of U.S. mergers, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) examine 
impact of a merger on the acquirers. They calculate the returns using BHAR methodology and 
as benchmark return they employ both value- and equally-weighted market indexes. By using 
value-weighted, their results suggest that the average abnormal return for the three years post-
merger -0.11% per month (at the 10% level of significance). With respect to using equally-
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weighted index, the value disruption is reported to be more severe, suggesting that the average 
abnormal return is -0.25% per month (at the 5% significance level). Hence, if anomaly exists, 
it appears to be more profound to small acquirers. 
Savor and Lu (2009) examine U.S. acquisition completed between 1978 and 2003. They 
investigate if stock-deals are in the interest of the acquirer’s shareholders by using a sample of 
successful and failed acquirers. With respect to stock-deals, their results show negative post-
merger acquirer returns, but for the unsuccessful stock-bidders the returns are even more 
negative. Hence, the authors conclude that carrying out a merger is ultimately beneficial to the 
long-term shareholders. Moreover, the findings support the hypothesis that overvalued firms 
try to time the market replacing their overvalued equity to hard assets.  
The most recent study examining long-term value creation or disruption related to a merger is 
the working paper of Malmendier et al. (2014). The researches examine acquirers’ post-
merger long-term performance applying a rather novel approach. They suggest that by 
investigating merger contests and using the contest loser’s performance to construct the 
counterfactual performance of the winner had he not won the merger contest helps to address 
the identification issues. In their sample Malmendier et al. (2014) include 180 bids by public 
U.S. companies, 90 winners and losers, announced between January 1, 1985 and December 
31, 2009. The researchers find that abnormal returns of merger contest winners and losers are 
closely aligned before the merger, but post-merger the returns tend to diverge; winners 
performing 50% more poorly than the same contest loser over the following three years after 
the merger.  
2.3 Deal characteristics  
There is a considerable literature on the specific deal characteristics that have proven to affect 
the long-term post-merger performance. These transaction characteristics may bias the long-
term study results if the post-merger performance is associated with deal characteristics. Instead 
of trying to cover every deal attributes empirically tested, I select those that are commonly 
used by academics: payment method (stock or cash), bidder attitude (friendly or hostile), number 
of bidders, the public status of the target, industry relatedness (focused or diversified), deal size, 
acquirer size, acquirer Tobin’s Q, or target size. The characteristic presented in this chapter will 
be investigated in this study. 
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Payment method (cash or stock payment) 
Stock-financed acquisitions have clustered around the period of high market valuations and 
led to negative long-term returns (see e.g. Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006). 
Numerous studies have found that the method of payment plays an essential role in explaining 
the abnormal stock returns of bidding firms. Stock-financed deals are documented to result in 
significantly negative abnormal returns over both long and short horizons (see e.g. Asquith, 
1983; Huang and Walking, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997).  
Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that acquisitions financed with cash result in a significantly 
better long-term stock performance in relation to acquisitions financed with stock. The 
authors investigate the mode of acquisition (merger or tender offer) and the method of 
payment (stock or cash) with a sample of 947 U.S. acquisitions in during 1970-1989. The 
researchers find that stock mergers generate significantly negative excess returns of -25.0%, 
whereas cash tender offers earn positive excess returns of 61.7%. Ghosh (2001) and Linn and 
Switzer (2001) put more evidence on the argument that cash deal are superior to stock-deals 
by documenting that cash would be more favorable payment method with respect to a 
company’s long-term operating performance.  
If an acquiring company announced a cash-offer, the shareholders would consider this as 
“good news”, and conclude that the management perceives the stock undervalued and it is 
likely that the stock will readjust upwards. These results support the theories that managers 
are timing the market and use equity in acquisitions when they believe that the company’s 
stock is overpriced in the market. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004), companies carry out mergers when that their stock overvalued 
(information asymmetry). Under this scenario, companies obtain undervalued assets, such as a 
target company, by using their overvalued shares. As a result, the announcement effect of 
mergers is negative as the acquirers’ overvaluation become publicly visible; the level of 
information asymmetry has decreased. On the other hand, it could be concluded if the 
company had not undertaken the merger, the stock price could have dropped even more.  
However, the free cash flow theory states exactly the opposite. According to “free cash flow” 
theory of Jensen (1986), managers endowed with free cash flow will rather choose to undergo 
negative net present value projects than to distribute cash out to shareholders. In line with this 
theory all-cash acquisition are likely to generate negative abnormal long-term returns, since 
the manager engage in value-destroying mergers to avoid increasing dividend pay-outs. Cash-
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rich firms can either return the excess cash to the owners by means of dividends or invest it to 
purchasing a company. According to “free cash flow” theory of Jensen (1986), managers 
endowed with free cash flow will rather choose to undergo negative net present value projects 
than to distribute cash out to shareholders. In line with this theory all-cash acquisition are 
likely to generate negative abnormal long-term returns, since the manager engage in value-
destroying mergers to avoid increasing dividend pay-outs. 
Malmendier et al. (2014) also suggest that the severe underperformance of acquirers in 
relation to unsuccessful bidders could be related to cash acquisitions. With respect to the cash 
deals, Malmendier et al. (2014) conclude that acquirers may have to raise additional debt to 
finance the compensation amount which may explain the observed increase in debt post-
merger. Accordingly, the market may consider that the long-term health of the company is 
endangered due to increased leverage which, in turn, is reflected in the stock price. The 
interpretation is in line with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory referring that an increased 
leverage ratio may constrain the future investments decisions which in turn decreases the 
value of the firm. Cai and Zhang (2011) show a significant negative correlation between a 
firm's leverage ratio and its stock prices. Thus increased leverage ratio may lead to a situation 
where the firms’ future investment opportunities are restricted and this is reflected in the share 
price.  
Attitude (friendly or hostile) 
The empirical evidence on studies examining shareholder gains related to friendly and hostile 
bids is rather mixed. It is suggested that hostile bidders may need to bid higher than friendly 
acquirers (e.g. Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Thus, this may result overbidding which can be 
associated with negative long-term abnormal stock returns.  
Number of bidders 
It is logical that the competition for a target company tightens when there are several bidders. 
Prior studies show that the presence of multiple bidders has affected the bid premium by 
increasing it. It could be that when there are multiple bidders the winner act irrationally and 
pays too much (Dodd, 1980; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2003). According to Mandelker 
(1974) and Asquith (1983), the absence of significant positive abnormal returns could reflect 
the existence of perfect competition in the acquisition market. 
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Target’s public status 
When an acquisition of a privately held target is financed with common stock, the process 
resembles a private placement of equity as the number of target shareholders is small. Chang 
(1998) discovers that the mean value of the acquisition is significantly smaller for privately 
held targets than for publicly traded targets. Chang (1998) explains the finding with limited 
competition hypothesis associated with private targets, as it is likely that if markets are highly 
competitive, the expected profits shrink and the acquisition turns into a zero net present value 
investment.  
As public information on privately held targets is more scarce compared to the listed targets, 
the cost of information search may be costly. However, if the competition is not as aggressive 
as for privately held targets, the bidding companies may show positive stock returns due to 
increased likelihood of underpayment. On the other hand positive bidder returns may be 
caused by realized synergies (Chang, 1998). Faccio et al. (2006) examine announcement 
returns of public and private targets in 17 Western Europe countries. The authors report that 
the acquirers which obtain a private target earn a significant excess return of 1.48%, while the 
acquirer of public target report a negative abnormal return of 0.38% 
Public firms have legal liabilities to disclose information on accounting and future outlook to 
the public and the information is widely available to bidders. However, private firms are free 
from this regulated obligation, and therefore the information asymmetry is greater between 
acquirers and private targets than between public targets. This worry related to information 
asymmetry is captured with the so-called liquidity premia of Fuller et al. (2002). Moreover, 
when acquiring a private target, the risk of not evaluating the assets properly is likely to be 
high (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2007). Hence, bidding for a private target is associated with a 
risk of adverse selection to which bidders have responded by employing a private company 
discount in offer price (Akerlof, 1970).  
Industry relatedness 
During the 1990s, the popular view was that corporate diversification destroys value. Berger 
and Ofek (1995) point out that conglomerates in the U.S. are priced, on average, at 15% 
discount. Also papers of Lang and Stulz (1994) and Bradley et al. (1998) support the view 
that diversification is associated with value disruption. Although it should be noted that in the 
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paper of Lang and Stulz (1994) the companies performed poorly even before the 
conglomeration.  
In a more recent study, Graham et al. (2002) analyse several hundred companies expanding 
through acquisition or increasing business lines. Graham et al. (2002) find that units that are 
added into a conglomerate via a merger are initially priced at significant discount in 
comparison to an average standalone company operating in the same industry. Hence the 
discounted units weight down the excess value of the combined company. It is suggested that 
the reason for carrying out diversified acquisitions may be due to poor growth opportunities in 
field of industry in which the company operates (Graham et al., 2002; Campa and Kedia, 
2002). Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2003) report a surprising finding that the presence of 
multiple bidders has a greater impact on paid premiums when the eventual acquirer and the 
target operate in industries unrelated to each other. 
Deal size 
Larger mergers should generate larger value losses, if managers are motivated by corporate 
control and empire building, suggesting that the underlying reason for a merger is not to 
increase corporate value, but to satisfy manager’s self-interests (Gorton and Rosen, 1995). In 
addition, Bliss and Rosen (2001) point out that CEO compensation is usually positively 
related to the firm size. Hence, closing bigger deals may trigger bigger bonuses. In contrast, 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) and DeLong (2001) find that gains earned in financial mergers 
are positively related to the deal size. 
Target size (large or small) 
It could be the case that the target size may be proxy for the unobserved complexity 
associated with large deals. According to Loderer and Martin (1990) acquiring a large target 
is associated with greater losses compared to obtaining a small target. The authors conclude 
that companies pursuing larger target are likely to overpay. Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
examine U.S. completed deals between 1990 and 2007 finding that takeovers of large target 
underperform small targets by 2.37% in terms of announcement returns. Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) suggest that their findings are associated with the relatively greater complexity 
inherent in large deals and it is more difficult to carry out post-merger integration and capture 
the estimated synergies when the target is large in size.  
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On the other hand, the difficulty to integrate huge target into a combined enterprise may refer 
to the fact that there are fewer acquirers seeking large targets, which may decrease the level of 
competition, and hence lead to a lower takeover premia (Gorton et al., 2009; Alexandridis et 
al., 2010). 
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3 Data and metodology 
In this section, I first introduce how the sample set of U.S. merger contests is obtained. 
Second, I go through the data construction process, after which I present the methodology 
employed in this study. In the methodology chapter, I present the two long-term approaches 
common in the recent empirical studies: buy-and-hold abnormal returns and calendar-time 
portfolio regressions.  
3.1 Sample design 
The data utilized in this study is obtained from different data sources: the Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database, The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), CRSP/Compustat Merged Database, and Kenneth French Data 
Library5. In Table 1 I present the summary of data retrieved from the corresponding 
databases. 
Table 1. Data extracted from the corresponding data source. 
The sample of merger contests utilized in this study is constructed using three different data sources: the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database, The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and CRSP/Compustat 
Merged Database. SDC database is used to identify all U.S. mergers with overlapping bids by at least two 
potential acquirers. CRSP and Compustat meet the information need for financial and accounting data. 
SDC Sample of bid announcement for U.S.   CUSIP codes 
 target 1/1985- 12/2012  Name of acquirer 
 Transaction value  Name of competing bidder 
 Means of Payment  Tickers 
 Nation  Competing bid deal code 
 SDC deal number  Status of the offer 
 Attitude  Challenged deal acquirer CUSIP 
 SIC codes  Deal effective date 
 Bid announcement date  Target of the competing bid 
 Bid withdrawal date  Target public status 
 Number of bidders  History File Event  
 % of stock  Synopsis 
 % of cash  % of other 
Kenneth French 
Data Library 
   
Industry definition  Industry returns on a monthly basis. 
CRSP Stock returns  Fama-French three factors and  
 Delisting returns  a momentum factor 
 Delisting  Value-weighted index return 
 Acquirer PERMCO  Acquirer PERMNO 
Compustat  
(Annual and 
quarterly) 
Total assets  Sales 
Stockholder’s equity  Cost of goods sold 
Operating income  Selling, general and administrative expenses 
 Property, plants and equipment  Fiscal quarter closing price 
 Debt in current liabilities  Common shares outstanding 
 Long-term debt  Closing stock price 
 
                                                 
5I thank Kenneth French for providing this data on his Web page under Data Library: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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SDC database, a standard information source on mergers and acquisitions, is used to identify 
the sample of U.S. mergers with overlapping bids by at least two potential acquirers. CRSP 
and Compustat, in turn, meet the information need for financial and accounting data, while 
Kenneth French Data Library is utilized to obtain industry returns. I combine data gathered 
from these sources to construct a comprehensive data set of merger contests including 
information on deal, target, and bidder characteristics.  
3.2 Sample construction 
I start my sample collection with SDC database by extracting bid announcements from U.S.-
based public companies between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2012. Thus, bids related 
to either completed or uncompleted U.S. mergers are included in the sample. When gathering 
data from SDC database, I impose the following additional identifying restrictions. I collect 
bids only by companies engaged in a merger contest by using an additional criterion in SDC; I 
set the flag representing competing bidders as “yes”. I continue excluding bidders following 
the criteria suggested by Malmendier et al. (2014): 
 privately held and government-owned companies,  
 joint ventures,  
 investor groups,  
 mutually owned companies, 
 subsidiaries and unidentifiable companies, and  
 bidders classified as white knights6  
The listed criteria are set to be able to examine merger contests in which all the bidders have 
ex-ante an equal chance of acquiring a target company. It could be possible that targets would 
be less receptive to bids by overvalued companies. Based on the findings of Dong et al. 
(2006), the bidder valuation has no effect on the probability of deal success, and therefore I do 
not address this concern in my paper. Furthermore, I eliminate bidders that are parent 
companies of a target, as a parent company is unlikely to be a good comparison to other rival 
bidders in terms of chances of winning. With respect to the public status, only publicly listed 
companies are included in the sample enabling analyses based on stock performance and an 
easy access to comprehensive accounting information. 
                                                 
6 White knights have higher chances in winning the merger contest as they are usually in favor of both the board 
of directors’ and the target management. Moreover, white knights have tendency to overbid as are likely to enter 
into a merger contest for other than strictly value creation purposes (Niden, 2003). 
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Company identification codes 
Accordingly, I extract the following information on the acquirers and targets from SDC 
database: company name, SIC code, nation, public status, six-digit CUSIP, company ticker. I 
also collect deal-specific information: SDC deal number, competing bid deal code, status 
(whether the bid is completed or withdrawn), attitude (friendly or hostile), number of bidders 
involved in a merger contest, challenged deal acquirer CUSIP, name of the challenging 
bidder, target of the competing bid (name), challenged deal target CUSIP, bid announcement 
date, bid withdrawal date, deal effective date, transaction value denominated in dollars, and 
the percentage of the transaction value paid in cash, stock, or other means of payment. To 
examine the backgrounds of merger contests, I extract both synopsis and History File Event 
from SDC. 
The initial sample size of public bids either completed or withdrawn is 877, out of which 388 
bids stands for both the number acquirers and merger contests, while the rest 489 bids 
represent unsuccessful competing bidders (status as withdrawn). I demand that in each 
bidding contests there is only one acquirer that has completed the transaction and that at least 
one bidder has withdrawn its bid after competing for the same target which is identified based 
on the SDC’s target CUSIP code. Furthermore, I also verify that the same target appears only 
once in the whole sample and that the bid announcements for the target company are 
overlapping. I exclude bids by those acquirers (competing bidders) that are not effective at the 
same time as the bids by competing unsuccessful bidders (acquirers).  
After identifying the number of merger contests and related acquirers and competing bidders, 
I match the company specific six-digit CUSIP (SDC) codes of acquirers, targets and 
competing unsuccessful bidders to CRSP’s historical CUSIP (NCUSIP) codes. CRSP’s 
CUSIP codes are eight-number codes, and by removing the last two numbers, the codes 
become identical to those extracted from SDC. By using CRSP’ CUSIP codes I collect 
CRSP’s permanent company identifier (PERMCO), and CRSP’s permanent issue identifier 
(PERMNO) codes for acquirers, targets and competing unsuccessful bidders. PERMCO code 
is a permanent for all securities issued, regardless of changes in company names7. I manually 
confirm that the names of companies recorded by SDC (CUSIP codes) match to those 
disclosed by CRSP (CUSIP codes).  
                                                 
7 http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/crsp-link 
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Following the approach of Megginson et al. (2004) and Savor and Lu (2009) I exclude all the 
overlapping acquisitions by the same acquirer and competing bidders. In my sample it means 
that no bids can be registered by the same company for another target for the following three 
years. Furthermore, as the sample is relatively small and thus sensitive to possible 
mismatches, I manually verify that each bids by acquirers are overlapping and that the names 
of the contest winner and the contest loser match to those given by SDC. Moreover, to 
confirm that the SDC data is valid I search articles concerning the merger contests presented 
in the data set from the following sources: Bloomberg News, Los Angeles Times, The New 
York Times, and Ebsco Electronic News. 
Extracting financial and accounting data  
Utilising the collected company specific PERMNO and PERMCO codes described above, I 
obtain monthly stock returns for the acquirers and competing bidders around the merger 
contest from CRSP Monthly Stock database. In CRSP I select as an output value-weighted 
index return (VWRETD), and monthly holding period stock return (RET) for bidding 
companies for the period between June 28, 1982 and March 31, 2015. In addition, I extract 
delisting codes (DLSTCD), and delisting returns (DLRET) for bidders. The CRSP holding 
period total returns are from month-end to month-end and adjusted for stock splits, 
exchanges, and cash distributions (common events around mergers). The acquirers and 
competing bidders are listed either on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and have data available on 
CRSP and Compustat. Both the acquirers’ and the competing bidders’ stock prices have to be 
available for three years before the first bid announcement is published and three years after 
the merger contest is ended. If the return data is not available for the period of three years 
after the merger due to delisting, I use delisting returns and the newly issued stock (if 
available) or the value-weighted index to represent the returns. Monthly industry returns 
needed as benchmark returns are based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification using 
SIC codes and provided by the Kenneth French Data Library. I use the Fama-French 12-
industry classification, because a broad classification ensures that mergers categorized as 
diversifying are truly unrelated. 
Lastly, I merge the resulting data with accounting data extracted from the Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual and Quarterly Database by using the 6-digit CUSIP identifier and the 
permanent company (PERMCO) and security numbers (PERMNO). I gather the following 
announcing information from Annual Database: total assets (AT), stockholder’s equity (SEQ), 
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operating income (OIBDP), and property, plants and equipment (PPENT). From 
Fundamentals Quarterly Database I obtain debt in current liabilities (DLCQ), long-term debt 
(DLTTQ), total assets (ATQ), common shares outstanding (CSHOQ), ﬁscal quarter closing 
price (PRCCQ), book value of shareholders’ equity (SEQQ), sales (SALEQ), cost of goods 
sold (COGSQ), and selling, general and administrative expenses (XSGAQ). From CRSP 
Fama-French data library I collect the one-month Treasury Bill rate (RF), the Fama-French 
factor returns (MKTRF, SMB, HML) and the momentum factor return (UMD). 
The sample in this paper consist of 93 merger contests: 194 bidders, 93 winners, 101 losers, 
and 13,968 event-time observations. I balance the sample based on the closest transaction 
values and the time spent between the bid announcement and withdrawal, resulting to a final 
sample of 93 winners, losers, and a total of 13,392 event-time observations.  
3.2.1 Contest duration 
In the empirical analysis, I apply the idea of Malmendier et al. (2014) and divide my sample 
based on contest duration so that I am able to make a difference between merger contests 
based on their duration. Those contests in which bidders have ex-ante similar changes of 
winning are likely to last longer time, as both the bidders hold similar valuations of the target. 
As a result, more bidding rounds is needed until the valuation of the target exceeds either of 
the bidder’s limit. After an intensive bidding contest profit for the acquirer tends to be 
smaller, however if the acquirers are rational they are expected to make profit on average. On 
the other hand, if the merger contest last only a couple of months, it is likely that the 
valuations of the bidders differ a lot. In that case, it is likely the winner makes a nice profit 
having to pay only the valuation of the rival bidder, even if the winner would have valued the 
target a lot higher.  
I examine all the merger contests in my sample by studying media reports8, History File 
Events (from SDC), and synopsis (from SDC). I discover that in the long-duration contests 
the offers have typically been sweetened in a consequence of several bidding rounds, whereas 
in the short-duration contests another bidder tends to withdraw shortly after the contest has 
begun, perhaps because of not seeing much chance to win due to e.g. major differences in 
valuations with other bidders. Moreover, I find out that the values of the offers are closest to 
each other in the long duration contests compared to other contest durations. These findings 
                                                 
8 Bloomberg News, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and Ebsco Electronic News. 
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support the view that contest duration could be associated with winner-loser similarity. 
Hence, it could be concluded that the performance of a competing bidder engaged in a long-
duration contest is likely to be a valid counterfactual for the performance of a contest winner. 
Malmendier et al. (2014) state that, “the merger eﬀect estimated on the subsample of close 
contests provides the most credible causal interpretation.” Accordingly, the authors split their 
sample into four subsamples to separate the long-duration contests (close contests) from those 
in which a winner is likely to have higher changes of winning. As the number of observations 
is relatively small, I split the sample into three subgroups based on the length of a merger 
contest. In the short-duration contests, duration varies between two and four months and in 
the medium-duration between five and nine months. All the rest of the merger contests, 
exceeding or equalling ten months, fall into the long-duration contest group, i.e. the close 
contest. As a result, the sample size split is the following: 32, 34, and 27 contests in the long, 
medium, and short-duration contests, respectively. The number of contests in the study of 
Malmendier et al. (2014) are 22, 23, 21, and 24 from the longest to the shortest contest 
quartile.  
3.2.2 Deal characteristics 
Method of payment 
The payment method for the deals is observed from SDC database, based on which I divide 
the sample into two groups: all-cash deals and all-stock deals. In all-cash deals all mergers are 
financed with cash only, while in all stock-deals acquirers’ only stock is used as a payment 
method. The mean deal value for all-stock deals is $6,684 million and for the all-cash deals 
the value is approximately $791 million. This indicates that all-stock deals tend to be larger in 
value in relation to all-cash deals, however there is a lot more value dispersion in all-stock 
deals as standard deviation is almost 20 times that in all-cash deals group. 
Organization form of the target 
Based on the information derived from the SDC, the whole sample is divided into two 
subsets: private and public targets. The average purchase price for a private target is $2,257 
million while the average deal value with a listed target is $3,983 million. Hence, listed target 
seems to be  
Related or diversifying merger 
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I use SIC codes retrieved from SDC database and Fama-French 12-industry (FF12) 
classiﬁcation to identify in which industry both the acquirers and target companies operate. 
The broad FF12 classification is employed to ensure that when identified a merger as a 
diversifying merger, the acquirer and target are truly unrelated. In the sample the 
manufacturing industry is most frequently presented accounting for 20% of the sample. 
Relative deal size 
The relative deal size is conducted by dividing the transaction value by the acquirer’s market 
value. I split the sample in half based on the median value. 
Large target Small target 
To examine if target size could explain the merger effect, I divide the full sample into half 
based on the target’s market value. When splitting the sample I use the median target’ market 
value. However, target data are not always available as approximately 16% of the targets are 
not publicly listed. 
Number of bidders 
The number of bidders involved in a merger contest is extracted from SDC database. Based 
on SDC information, I divide the sample so that the contests in which there are only two 
bidders form one group and contests with more than two bidders fall into the other sample 
group. 
Bid attitude (friendly vs. hostile) 
I split my sample into two groups based on takeover attitude from the target’s perspective 
identified by SDC database. In my sample friendly mergers are far more common compared 
to hostile ones amounting to 79 merger contests. 
Large Acquirer 
To examine if the acquirer is large or not, I calculate the acquirers’ market values. After 
which I split the sample in half using the median of the market values.   
High Acquirer Q 
To examine whether the acquirer is overvalued, I calculated Tobin’s Q for all acquirers.  
Tobin’s Q it the market value divided by total assets. I split the sample in half using the 
median of the calculated Tobin’s Q values.   
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3.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample covering winner, loser and deal 
characteristics, and event study returns. The winner and loser characteristics (Panel A) stand 
for the end of the fiscal year preceding the contest. The mean value of winners’ total assets is 
half that of losers. The difference is driven by a couple of big companies categorized as 
losers, like in market value figures, which are computed as the sum of total assets plus market 
value of equity minus book value equity. However, the sales seem to be around the same 
magnitude. Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value divided by total assets, is higher for 
winners amounting to 1.86 compared to 1.80, indicating that winners may be slightly more 
overvalued that the contest losers on average. There seem to be practically no difference 
between the contest winners and losers in the ratios of property plant and equipment to total 
assets, profitability, book leverage or market leverage. The leverage ratios are calculated as 
dividing the sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities by total assets (book 
leverage) or market value (market leverage). The test for differences in means is reported on 
the right hand side next to the winner-loser characteristics. Based on the test results, none of 
the winners’ characteristics differ significantly from those of the losers, supporting the view 
that contest losers could be regarded as a valid counterfactual for contest winners. 
Deal characteristics (Panel B) reveal that transaction values of executed deals are at least 
$3.3 million and the highest deal value goes up to $89 billion. This highest deal was closed in 
2000, when Pfizer Inc, a multinational pharmaceutical company, acquired Warner-Lambert 
Co, also a U.S.-based pharmaceutical company. In the sample the winners acquire at least 
50% of the target shares in all other mergers, expected for the one that was between Cathay 
Gen Bancorp and Great Eastern Bank and the amount shares acquired was 41%. For 
categorizing the deals to diversifying or related mergers, I use the Fama–French 12 industry 
classification. Over 80% of mergers in this samples are related mergers, meaning that the 
target operates in related industry as the acquirer. The vast majority of the deals, 
approximately 85%, are classified as friendly meaning that the attitude of the target 
company's management and the board is friendly towards the acquirer. The fraction of the 
deals financed with pure cash is 33.3%, while the percentage of all-stock mergers is around 
20.4%. The percentage of deals paid with mixed/other means of payment amounts to 46.2%. 
The maximum number of bidders in my sample is four bidders, but most of the merger 
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contests are between two bidders. In this sample almost 84% of the targets are publicly traded 
companies. The average contest duration for the whole sample is almost nine months. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
The sample includes all U.S. mergers with overlapping bids of at least two potential acquirers documented in the 
SDC database from January, 1985 to December, 2012 that meet the criteria described in subsection 3.1.1. 
Summary statistics are presented for winners and losers separately in Panel A. Accounting data on winner and 
loser characteristics is from the Compustat database and reported for the end of the fiscal year preceding the first 
bid announcement. The data on deal characteristics is from the SDC database and it is summarized in Panel B. 
Total assets are the book value of total assets. Market value is defined as the sum of total assets minus book 
value of shareholder’s equity plus market value of equity (fiscal quarter end closing price multiplied by common 
shares outstanding). Sales/turnover presents net sales and Tobin’s Q is calculated as market value divided by 
total assets. PP&E is book value of property, plant and equipment over total assets. Profitability is operating 
income before depreciation divided by total assets. Book leverage is calculated as dividing the sum of long-term 
debt plus debt in current liabilities by total assets. Market leverage is the sum of long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities divided by market value. The results for the test reporting whether differences in means are 
statistically significant are shown in diff column on the right. Deal value is the SDC transaction value of the deal.  
Deal size is defined as the deal value over the market value of the acquirer. Shares acquired is the percentage of 
shared acquired in the deal. Same industry refers to industrial relatedness decided based on the Fama–French 12 
industry classification. Hostile (Friendly) attitude is the fraction of deals in which the attitude of the target 
company's management or board of directors is hostile (friendly) toward the acquirer. All-cash deal is financed 
with pure cash, whereas all-stock deals denote a pure stock deal. Mixed/other payment types comprise all the 
remaining deals. Listed targets are targets that are listed on public stock market. Number of bidders represents 
how many bidders participated in a merger contest. Contest duration presents contest duration for the whole 
sample and three different contest duration lengths. 
Panel A: Winner and Loser characteristics 
 Contest Winners  Contest Losers  Diff. 
 Mean Std. Dev. N  Mean Std. Dev. N  p-value 
Total assets ($m) 16,947.86 66,116.18 93  31,009.92 226,570.3 93  0.21 
Market value ($m) 23,722.33 76,162.23 93  35,967.42 230,532.7 93  0.24 
Sales ($m) 6,729.99 15,969.4 93  5,553.39 17,695.26 93  0.74 
Tobin’s Q  1.86 1.37 93  1.80 1.34 93  0.67 
PP&E 0.28 0.24 93  0.29 0.26 93  0.29 
Profitability 0.12 0.08 93  0.13 0.12 93  0.14 
Book leverage 0.40 0.23 93  0.38 0.19 93  0.85 
Market leverage 0.27 0.19 93  0.26 0.17 93  0.68 
 
Panel B: Transaction characteristics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 1% 99% N 
Deal value ($m) 3,704.38 440 11,935.04 3.3 89,167.72 93 
Deal size (%) 35.36 12.50 63.70 0.20 137.40 93 
Shares acquired (%) 97.11 100 9.44 41 100 93 
Related industry (%-share of  deals) 82.80  37.95   93 
Hostile attitude (%-share of  deals) 10.75  31.15   93 
Friendly attitude (%-share of  deals) 84.95  35.95   93 
All stock deal (%-share of  deals) 20.43  40.54   93 
All cash deal (%-share of  deals) 33.33  47.40   93 
Mixed/Other payment (%-share of  deals) 46.24  50.13   93 
Listed targets (%-share of  deals) 83.87  36.98   93 
Number of bidders 2.20 2 0.46 2 4 93 
Contest duration (months), short 3.52 4 0.75 2 4 27 
Contest duration (months), medium 6.62 6.5 1.21 5 9 34 
Contest duration (months), long 15.44 11.5 9.29 10 54 32 
Contest duration (months), full sample  8.75 7 7.42 2 54 93 
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The final sample illustrated in Figure 1 presents the overtime distribution of completed 
mergers contests and the average contest duration in months for each year. However, it should 
be noted that merger contests shown in Figure 1 represent only a marginal fraction of all 
acquisitions executed under the observation window, and therefore it is not a representation of 
all U.S. mergers and acquisitions completed over the given time line. Though, it can be 
concluded from Figure 1 that the number and duration of merger contests increase during the 
three most recent recognized merger waves9. The 4th merger wave in the U.S. started in 1981 
and ended by 1989, while the 5th wave occurred between 1993 and 1999. The 6th merger wave 
took place between 2003 and 2007 peaking around 2006, just as the average contest duration. 
Many transactions completed during the 5th merger wave, in the late 1990s, were 
compensated with richly valued equity (Andrade et al., 2001; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that overvalued companies would carry out a merger to 
acquirer hard asset at discount, which can explain the observed all-stock clustering during the 
fifth merger wave in my sample. 
 
                                                 
9 To obtain more insight into merger wave I refer to e.g. Harford (2005) 
Figure 1. Mergers contests over time, June 1985 and March 2012. Data are from the SDC Merger and 
Acquisitions Database. Figure presents the distribution of completed merger contests over time. Years are the 
calendar years in which the contest ended and the deal was closed. The columns correspond to the vertical axis 
on the left and plot the number of merger contests over time, they also classify whether the merger was 
financed with all-cash, all-stock or with a mix of different payment types. The dotted line corresponds to the 
vertical axis on the right and represents the average contest duration in months for each year. All data is 
obtained from SDC Merger and Acquisitions Database. 
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3.3 Event study methodology 
An event study is a research methodology to measure stock performance following a certain 
event. The methodology received a broad audience when introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969) who conducted the methodology to test the stock market’s reaction to stock 
splits. Since then executing an event study has become a standard choice among capital 
market researchers. MacKinlay (1997) documents in his study that the roots of event study go 
back to Dolley (1933) and several other publications, and that by the 1960s, event studies had 
already found their way into leading economics journals (see, e.g. Myers and Bakay, 1948; 
Barker, 1956, 1957, 1958; Ashley, 1962). 
The purpose of event studies is to detect abnormal changes in stock price performance of 
listed companies, occurring because of an identified “event”, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, initial public offerings, or seasoned equity offerings. I construct the event study 
in a typical way: first the event is identified and the event widow surrounding it is determined 
(Section 3.3.1). After that, I estimate the expected returns (Section 3.3.2), and calculate the 
abnormal returns (Section 3.3.3). 
3.3.1 Defining event window 
The first step in employing an event study is to identify the event and then define an event 
window (time frame) surrounding that event. The event, a merger contest, begins in the same 
month when the first bid is announced by either the contest winner of loser. The merger 
contest is considered to be terminated in the end of that month when the merger is completed. 
This approach to determine an event window is in line with the previous empirical tests 
investigating long-term abnormal returns (e.g. Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Betton et al., 
2008; Malmendier et al., 2014). Accordingly the event time is defined so that when t = 0, it 
indicates the end of month preceding the beginning of a merger contest, while t = 1 stands for 
the end of month of the merger completion. Both the pre- and post-event window last three 
years, a total of 36 months. 
Figure 2 shows an example of the time line construction for a merger contest involving two 
bidders, companies A and B. Company A announces its bid first, which starts the merger 
contest. Thus, only the first initial bid from either the bidders, Company A or B, activated the 
merger contest. Later, Company A withdraws and Company B completes the merger, which 
ends the merger contest in the end of that month.  
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The event window, i.e. the length between t = 0 and t = 1, varies depending on duration of a 
merger contest, and thus the return at t = 1 embodies the performance over the whole merger 
contest, from the beginning to its end. 
 
Figure 2. Time line for the event study. t = 0 presents the end of month preceding the beginning of the merger 
contest, i.e. the end of month preceding the earliest bid announcement. t = - 1 is the end of month preceding t = 
0, and so forth. t = + 1 stands for the end of month, in which the merger is completed and the contest is ended. 
Thus, the length between t = 0 and t = + 1 varies depending on the contest duration. Before t = 0 and after t = + 1 
every period is exactly one month long.  t = + 2 is the end of the following moth after t = + 1. 
3.3.2 Selecting expected return benchmarks 
When estimating merger-related abnormal returns calculated over a long horizon, the results 
are highly sensitive to the chosen benchmark returns, as concluded in Section 2. As a result, it 
is common in long-run event studies that several different proxies for expected return are 
employed to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the effect under review, by 
limiting the sensitiveness of the results towards one specific benchmark. In this study I use the 
following common expected return benchmarks: market returns and industry returns. 
Market returns  
Market return data represents CRSP value-weighted index. The model assumes that the 
expected return of an individual company can be estimated by the market return. Hence, the 
expected return when using market return as a benchmark return is as follows: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝑟𝑚𝑡,                                                                                                                                          (1) 
where 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return based on a value weighted index
10 at time t for a merger 
contest j and a bidder i. 
 
 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Moeller et al. (2005), and Malmendier et al., (2014) using value weighted index as a proxy for market 
return 
First bid 
         t= -35                         t= -1          t=0
Pre-event window    Event window  Post-event window
             Withdrawal of bid 
      Completion of merger
  First bid 
    t= +1        t= +2                       t= +36
Company A
Company B
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Industry returns  
In addition to market returns, another normal return benchmark used in this study is industry 
returns, or more specifically, average value weighted industry returns. When dividing contest 
bidders into different industry sectors I base my approach on a broad industry classification, 
Fama-French 12-industry (FF12) classiﬁcation. To identify in which industry a bidder 
operates, I use a four-digit Standard Industrial Classification code (SIC code).  
When constructing industry returns I notice that there are bidders changing their industry 
membership over the observation time, and thus I rebalance the industry returns on a yearly-
basis. The expected return when using industry return as a benchmark return is calculated as: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝑟𝑘𝑡,                                                                                                                                           (2)  
where 𝑟𝑘𝑡 is the return on industry group k to which an individual bidder i belongs to, while t 
denotes time and j represents the merger contest in question.  
3.3.3 Long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
In this subsection I present the employed post and pre-merger buy-and-hold abnormal return 
methodology. Nowadays, the buy-and-hold abnormal return methodology (BHAR) can be 
regarded as a standard methodology when investigating long-term abnormal returns.11 
BHARs present the difference between the compounded bidder stock returns and the 
compounded selected benchmark return over the same time period. To obtain more insight 
into the BHAR methodology, I refer to Section 2.2. The post- and pre-merger BHARs 
presented in this subsection are calculated following the approach of Malmendier et al. 
(2014). To address the issue of possible outliers in the abnormal returns, I have winsorized the 
BHARs at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See studies of e.g. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995),  Loughran and Vijh, (1997), Barber and 
Lyon (1997), Affleck-Graves (1999), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Malmendier et al. (2014) 
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Post-event Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
I conduct post-merger monthly BHARs separately for each bidder engaged in a merger 
contest for the period of three years after the merger is completed. The BHARs for a bidder i, 
contest j, during a period t is conducted as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏[1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 ]
𝜏
𝑡=1
− ∏[1 + 𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)] 
𝜏
𝑡=1
 ,                                                                              (3) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑠 is a bidder return i at month t, and 𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡) denotes the expected return for the same 
bidder i at time t. As a proxy for expected returns I use the two previously listed benchmarks: 
market and industry returns. The calculation of post-merger BHARs starts from the month 
when the first bid is publicly announced and ends when the merger is completed, embodying 
the performance over the whole merger contest as presented in Figure 2.   
The compounded return at t = 1 is calculated separately for the bidders and the return 
benchmarks: 
𝑟𝑖𝑗1 = ∏[1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 ]
𝜏
𝑡
 ,                                                                                                                             (4) 
where t represents the month when the first bid for the target company was publically 
announced by one of the bidders engaged in a merger contests j, while T denotes the length of 
the merger contest, i.e. the end of month of merger completion. 
Pre-event Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
When constructing BHARs for the period of three years before to the first bid announcement, 
commencing the merger contest, I cumulate the returns backward as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏[1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 ]
−1
𝜏
𝑡=1
− ∏[1 + 𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)] 
−1
𝜏
𝑡=1
 ,                                                                     (5) 
where the variables are equal to Equation (3) above, but the beginning of the cumulating 
period differs from the one used in Equation (3), by starting from the end of month preceding 
the beginning of merger contest, i.e. the end of month before the first bid announcement. 
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3.4 Measuring winner-loser post-merger differences 
In this study I follow the novel methodology of Malmendier et al. (2014) in estimating the 
long-run returns to mergers by treating merger contest losers as counterfactuals. The idea 
behind focusing on a merger contest is to use post-merger performance of a contest loser as a 
counterfactual, benchmark performance for a winner, had he not won the contest. Even 
though, the assumption would not be exactly true, it is likely that winners are more similar to 
losers than to the average company in the market. Besides, the bidders engaged in a merger 
contests are identical in that sense that they both have selected a strategy to grow 
inorganically, and the acquisition target is the same for both. To test post and pre-merger 
return correlations between winners and losers, I compare average abnormal market and 
industry adjusted stock returns of winners and losers before the merger contest, similar to 
Malmendier et al. (2014). 
3.4.1 Piecewise linear regression to analyze winner-loser differences 
Provided, that contest losers are a valid counterfactual, I run a piecewise linear regression, a 
switching regression for time series, which enables me to estimate break-points in regression 
with respect to differences between contest winners and losers. The formula for piecewise 
regression is as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡,                                                                                                     (6) 
 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return +/- 3 years 
around the merger contest j for the bidder i in month t, calculated in Equations (3) and (5).  
BHARs are normalized to zero in the month preceding the start of the contest, i.e. the first bid 
announcement. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes a dummy for a winner in a merger contest j, taking the value of 1 
when the bidder i is also a winner. t is an event time variable, and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 is also a dummy, 
indicating whether or not a period t belongs to the post-merger period. When running the 
regression I cluster standard errors by merger contests. In Equation (6), 𝑛𝑗  represents contest 
fixed effects, i.e. indicator variables for each merger contest taking into account 
characteristics in each contest groups.  
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3.4.2 Merger effect  
After running Equation (6), I use its coefficient estimates to capture a similar merger effect as 
conducted in the paper of Malmendier et al. (2014): 
?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35(?̂?3 + ?̂?7)                    (7) 
 
The winner dummy’s coefficient estimate is denoted as ?̂?1, while ?̂?5 corresponds to the shift 
in the winner-loser performance when the pre-event time dummy (t = 0) turns to post-event 
time (t = 1). The terms ?̂?3 and ?̂?7 capture monthly coefficient estimates for winner-loser trend 
difference in performance during the pre- and post-merger period. I multiply the term (?̂?3 + 
?̂?7) by 35 (months) to report the total long-term divergence after three years has passed since 
the contested merger was completed. 
3.4.3 Differences in payment method 
When examining whether a payment method could affect the results, I run the regression 
employed in the paper of Malmendier et al. (2014). The regression is an extension to the 
previously presented piecewise linear regression. The regression is formed by adding a new 
variable, 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 representing the percentage paid in stock, into the equation: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 1𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 2 𝑡 + 𝛼 3𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼 6𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 7𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 8𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼 9𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 10𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 +
 𝛼 11𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 12𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 13𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼 14𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 15𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡                                        (8) 
3.5 Calendar-Time Portfolio 
An alternative to buy-and-hold technique in long horizon event studies is the Jensen-alpha 
approach or the calendar-time portfolio approach. The calendar-time methodology was first 
introduced by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) to eliminate the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence of returns. In the financial-economics literature the methodology is suggested to 
overcome the potential issues related to event-time approaches, such as overlapping returns.  
The significant results generated with BHARs may be explained by cross-sectional 
dependence of abnormal returns. As Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) have 
documented all cross-correlations of event companies are taken into account in calendar-time 
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portfolio approach. To mitigate the problems associated with the BHAR methodology, I run 
the calendar-time portfolio regressions on the common risk factors, Fama-French three factors 
and Carhart four factors. 
3.5.1 Fama-French three factor model 
I construct an equally-weighted zero-cost portfolio long in the successful bidders’ stock and 
short in the unsuccessful bidders’ stocks. The bidders’ monthly stock returns (total returns) 
taking place between the merger contest and 36 months after the merger completion are 
included in the portfolio. The long-short portfolio is rebalanced every month to drop bidders’ 
returns exceeding the given period and to add bidders that have just entered into a merger 
contest. The excess returns of the long-short portfolio are regressed on the common risk 
factors, Fama-French three factors and Carhart four factors, presumed to generate expected 
returns (Moeller et. al., 2005). First, I estimate alphas regressing the long-short portfolio 
excess returns on the three Fama-French (1993) factors: 
𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                                                              (9) 
where 𝑟𝑝𝑡 is the equal weighted long-short portfolio’s return in month t, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 denotes the one-
month Treasury bill rate, i.e. the risk free rate. 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return on the CRSP value 
weighted index, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 stands for the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio 
representing the difference in returns between small-cap stocks and large-cap stocks, while 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio representing the difference in 
returns between high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The regression 
intercept or alpha, 𝛼, is the measure of average monthly abnormal return on the portfolio. If 
the Fama-French model provides a complete description of expected returns, the alpha 
deviating from zero provides support to the question on whether or not the unsuccessful 
bidders tend to outperform the successful ones in the long-run.  
3.5.2 Carhart four factor model 
A later modification of Fama-French three factor model was developed by Carhart (1997) 
who added the fourth factor, a momentum-related factor, into the equation:  
𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                         (10) 
where all the variables are identical to Fama-French model, Equation (9), except for 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 
which is the difference between returns of winners and losers over the past 12 months.  
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4 Empirical results 
In this Section, I present the empirical results. First, I investigate the winner-loser differences 
in the long-run abnormal returns by looking at the visual evidence. Second, I test the 
statistical significance and the magnitude of the visual impression. Third, I examine if the 
transaction characteristics affect acquirer long-term performance, and I look more closely into 
the impact of payment method. Finally, I probe the robustness of the reported results.  
4.1 Visual evidence 
In Panel A of Figure 3 I illustrate differences in paths of the market adjusted buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of the contest winners and losers. The abnormal returns are calculated based 
on piecewise linear regression and normalized to zero in the month preceding the first bid 
announcement commencing a merger contest. For completeness, I present the graph 
separately for the full sample and the three contest subsamples.  
When looking at the graph of the full sample, it can be observed that the contest winners have 
underperformed the contest losers already in a pre-merger phase, but the underperformance 
becomes more severe after the merger is completed. However, the winner-loser gap seems to 
stabilize after a year has passed since the winner has closed the deal. In the long-duration 
contests graphs, the losers slightly outperform the contest winners before the merger. When 
the merger is completed the abnormal returns of the contest losers gradually increase over the 
whole post-merger observation period of 36 months, whereas the abnormal returns of the 
winners turn to negative and widen further the gap between winners and losers. When looking 
at the graph of the medium-duration contests, no clear trend can be identified in the pre-
merger stage, but with respect to the post-merger performance, it seems that winners 
outperform the losers. In the short-duration contests, the contest winners outperform the 
contest losers pre-merger, but the trend is reversed post-merger.   
Three years (+36 months) after a merger is completed the gap in post-merger abnormal 
returns between contest winners and losers amounts to approximately -13.32, -43.59, +11.10, 
and -20.10 percentage points for the full sample, long-duration, medium-duration and short-
duration contests, respectively. Based on the visual impression it appears that winners 
perform worse than losers after the merger, except for the medium-duration contests in which 
winners seem be outperform the losers. Hence, the visual evidence supports findings of 
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Malmendier et al. (2014) disclosing that long-duration contest winners are associated with a 
negative long-term performance, but the short-term duration contest winners are likely to be 
better off after the merger. However, I have divided the sample into terciles, and therefore my 
subsamples are not exactly equivalent to those of Malmendier et al. (2014). 
In Panel B of Figure 3 I test whether the assumption of winners performing worse than losers 
still holds by using a different proxy for expected returns, industry returns, and simply the raw 
returns. Panel B depicts the distribution of the full sample when industry returns are used as a 
benchmark and when only raw returns are used. The full sample industry-adjusted BHARs are 
close to market-adjusted BHARs, reporting the underperformance of -8.56 percentage points 
for the full sample. The graph of unadjusted full sample BHARs illustrates that the contest 
losers beat the winners before and after the merger in terms of raw abnormal returns.  
Based on the graphs in Panel A and B of Figure 3, it can be concluded that the difference 
between the abnormal returns of winners and losers varies a lot depending on which 
subsample is under scrutiny. However, it seems that in every subsample the correlation 
between winners and losers increases significantly months before the merger. Following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014) I compare average abnormal market- and industry-
adjusted stock returns of winners and losers before the merger contest. I find that 
approximately a year before the merger the correlation is the strongest and most significant 
between abnormal returns of winners and losers in the long-duration contests. Thus, the 
contest winners and losers in the longest contest group are likely to have performed more 
similarly months before the merger, and the trends of both bidders are closely aligned in a 
pre-merger stage. The findings together with the visual evidence support the view that 
competing bidders engaged in a same merger contest as a contest winner could serve as a 
credible control group, especially in the longest duration contests. With respect to the post-
merger period, the correlations of abnormal performance are weaker in every subsample 
compared to those reported one year before the merger contest had commenced. 
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Panel A: Market-adjusted average BHARs, full sample and the three subsamples 
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Figure 5. Long-term abnormal path of contest winners and losers. The four graphs in Panel A show the 
average monthly market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of winners and losers for the full 
sample and the three contest duration subsamples: short-, medium-, and long-duration contests. Panel B depicts 
the average stock price performance of winners and losers for the full sample. The graphs present industry-
adjusted BHARs, and unadjusted BHARs (raw BHARs). The solid line represents the average abnormal return of 
contest winners and the dotted line denotes that of contest losers. 
 
 
Figure 6. Long-term abnormal path of contest winners and losers  
The four graphs in Panel A show the average monthly market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
of winners and losers for the full sample and three contest duration subsamples: short, medium and long duration 
Panel B: Industry-adjusted and unadjusted average BHARs, full sample 
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4.2 Winner-loser differences in post-merger performance 
Table 3 reports results of the long-term abnormal return differences in the performance of 
contest winners and losers for the three contest duration subsamples (columns (1) to (3)) and 
the full sample (column (4)). The difference in performance of winners and losers is 
calculated using market-adjusted BHARs and running the previously presented piecewise 
linear regression. The merger effect is captured following Equation (7), referring to contest 
winners under- or outperformance in relation to contest losers after three years has passed 
since the merger was completed.  
When looking at the results regarding the merger effect, the difference between contest 
winners and losers appears to be most pronounced in the long duration subgroups, indicating 
that acquirers obtaining a target company after fighting over it for at least ten months 
underperform the contest losers by 15.52%. The underperformance is statistically significant 
at the 10% level. On the contrary, the winner-loser performance differences are small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant for the medium- and short-duration contests, and also 
for the full sample. The results are similar when using a broader, unbalanced, sample in which 
there can be more than one contest loser pair for every contest winner.  
As a result, it appears that contest winners would underperform contest losers with respect to 
long-lasting merger contests. This indicates that merger deals preceded by long merger 
contests are not value-creating for the acquirers. Hence, the companies would have been 
better off without buying the target, provided that contest losers serve as a valid control group 
as the paper of Malmendier et al. (2014) the presented visual evidence suggest. Thus, the 
“cost” of winning a long-duration merger contest is around 15.52% over the time period 
starting from the beginning of the merger contest and ending three years after the deal is 
closed. 
My results differ from those presented by Malmendier et al. (2014), as they present a market-
adjusted winner underperformance of 46.4% in relation to losers for the long-duration 
contests. Moreover, Malmendier at al. (2014) also show that short-duration contest winners 
outperform contest losers by 54.27% in terms of market-adjusted abnormal returns. Both of 
the result of Malmendier et al. (2014) are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3. Long-Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns – Duration Subsamples  
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is 
used as a proxy for the expected return. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which 
estimates the winner-loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the 
standard errors are clustered by contests. The column (4) represents the full sample, while columns (1), (2), and 
(3) stand for the three contest duration subsamples. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets.  
 Market-adjusted BHARs 
Contest duration 
Long-duration 
(1) 
Medium-duration 
(2) 
Short-duration 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
     
Winner (𝛼1) 
-13.99 1.828 -12.31 -7.717 
(-1.58) (0.18) (-1.19) (-1.36) 
     
Period (𝛼2) 
-0.515* 0.0624 -0.110 -0.186 
(-1.94) (0.29) (-0.44) (-1.31) 
     
Winner x Period (𝛼3) 
0.249 -0.245 0.352 0.0983 
(0.96) (-0.90) (1.28) (0.63) 
     
Post Merger (𝛼4) 
-24.76 -12.86 14.15 -9.113 
(-1.12) (-0.87) (0.86) (-0.87) 
     
Winner x Post Merger 
(𝛼5) 
18.46 8.067 -6.768 7.335 
(0.95) (0.43) (-0.35) (0.67) 
     
Period x Post Merger 
(𝛼6) 
0.809* 0.0674 -0.277 0.223 
(1.87) (0.18) (-0.69) (0.94) 
     
Winner x Post Merger x 
Period (𝛼7) 
-0.820* -0.0118 0.110 -0.255 
(-1.82) (-0.03) (0.22) (-0.96) 
    
Merger Effect -15.524* 0.917 -2.922 -5.850 
N 4,608 4,896 3,888 13,392 
R2 0.334 0.293 0.161 0.269 
Merger contests 32 34 27 93 
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4.3 Transaction characteristics and post-merger performance 
Furthermore, I continue testing whether winners’ underperformance should be interpreted as 
the causal effect of mergers or if there are some possible measurable omitted variables that 
may bias the estimates. The transaction characteristics underperformance of winners may be 
associated with some deal characteristics, such as payment method or deal size, as discussed 
in the literature review Section 2.3. Accordingly, I split the sample into different subsamples 
based on the transaction characteristics that have empirically proven affect the long-term post-
merger performance. To investigate whether any of these characteristics may explain the 
underperformance of winners, I rerun the BHAR piecewise regression (Equation (6)) 
separately for each subsamples. 
Table 4 reveals the results for market-adjusted abnormal performance for the different 
subsamples related to payment method (columns (1) and (2)), deal attitude (columns (3) and 
(4)), and number of bidders (columns (5) and (6)). The payment method and number of 
bidders seem to have no impact on the merger effect, whereas the deal attitude appears to 
affect the long-term performance. If the deal attitude is categorised as hostile, winners 
underperform losers by 22% with the 10% significance level. The result could be explained 
by overbidding, as it is likely that friendly bidders may not need to sweeten the deal as much 
as hostile bidders have to. This view is well documented in the previous literature. The deal 
attitude could potentially explain the reported winners’ underperformance in long duration 
subsample as it is reasonable to assume that it would take longer for a hostile bidder to win 
the target if entered into a merger contest. Hence, if the hostile deal attitude is more frequently 
presented in long duration merger contests, hostile attitude may be the omitted variable 
explaining the reported underperformance. 
When splitting the sample based on target public status, the columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 
presents that if the target of a contested merger is a private company, after three years the 
merger is completed the contest winners show 14.29% worse performance than the 
unsuccessful bidders. The finding is significant at the 5% level. This result could imply that 
when buying a private company it may be difficult to estimate its true value which may lead 
to overpayment (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2007). This risk of overpaying is acknowledged by 
company managers which is why private company discounts are generally employed. 
However, according to the previous literature, most of the studies indicate that purchasing a 
39 
 
 
 
private target would be more beneficial to long-term shareholders in relation to obtaining a 
public target (see, e.g. Chang, 1998; Faccio et al., 2006). 
Table 4. Long-Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns – Transaction Characteristics 
 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is 
used as a proxy for the expected return. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which 
estimates the winner-loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the 
standard errors are clustered by contests. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets. The sample is divided in accordance with the method of 
payment (columns (1) and (2)), deal attitude (columns (3) and (4)), and number of bidders (columns (5) and (6)). 
 Market-adjusted BHARs 
 Payment method Attitude Number of bidders 
 
All-cash 
(1) 
All-stock 
(2) 
Friendly 
(3) 
Hostile 
(4) 
2 bidders 
(5) 
>2 bidders 
(6)  
       
Winner (𝛼1) -18.69* -5.882 -8.907 0.646 -10.37 4.139 
 (-1.95) (-0.48) (-1.38) (0.06) (-1.60) (0.39) 
       
Period (𝛼2) -0.284 -0.423 -0.214 -0.171 -0.131 -0.434 
 (-1.07) (-1.60) (-1.39) (-0.41) (-0.83) (-1.36) 
       
Winner x Period 
(𝛼3) 
0.480* -0.0299 0.132 -0.220 0.134 -0.0596 
(1.88) (-0.09) (0.74) (-0.62) (0.74) (-0.21) 
       
Post Merger 
(𝛼4) 
0.737 -19.26 -11.24 0.893 -10.84 -1.399 
 (0.04) (-0.70) (-1.01) (0.02) (-0.88) (-0.08) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger (𝛼5) 
15.10 -4.670 4.645 -10.11 6.533 10.92 
(0.73) (-0.27) (0.40) (-0.47) (0.58) (0.32) 
       
Period x Post 
Merger (𝛼6) 
-0.0241 0.462 0.263 0.102 0.157 0.517 
(-0.05) (1.09) (1.07) (0.11) (0.58) (1.10) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger x Period 
(𝛼7) 
-0.479 0.0498 -0.193 -0.140 -0.190 -0.544 
(-0.99) (0.12) (-0.65) (-0.27) (-0.66) (-0.77) 
Merger Effect -3.555 -9.858 -6.369 -22.044* -5.804 -6.081 
N 4,464 2,736 11,376 1,440 10,944 2,448 
R2 0.210 0.196 0.262 0.347 0.260 0.326 
Merger contests 31 19 79 10 76 17 
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Table 5. Long-Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns – Target characteristics 
 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is 
used as a proxy for the expected return. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which 
estimates the winner-loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the 
standard errors are clustered by contests. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets. The sample is divided in accordance with the target’s public 
status (columns (1) and (2)), industry relatedness (columns (3) and (4)), and deal size (columns (5) and (6)). 
 Market-adjusted BHARs 
 Target public status Relatedness Deal size 
 
Private target 
(1) 
Public target 
(2) 
Diversified 
(3) 
Focused 
(4) 
Large Deal  
(5) 
Small Deal 
(6)  
       
Winner (𝛼1) 6.828 -10.51 4.068 -10.17 -0.908 -14.67* 
 (0.79) (-1.61) (0.61) (-1.52) (-0.11) (-1.85) 
       
Period (𝛼2) 0.131 -0.247 0.295 -0.287* -0.00524 -0.372* 
 (0.60) (-1.51) (1.52) (-1.74) (-0.03) (-1.69) 
       
Winner x Period 
(𝛼3) 
-0.267 0.169 -0.120 0.144 -0.169 0.371 
(-0.79) (0.96) (-0.61) (0.78) (-0.82) (1.60) 
       
Post Merger 
(𝛼4) 
-45.56* -2.105 7.289 -12.52 -3.980 -14.36 
 (-1.78) (-0.19) (0.27) (-1.10) (-0.31) (-0.86) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger (𝛼5) 
-27.22** 13.98 -10.20 10.98 4.609 10.12 
(-2.17) (1.09) (-0.44) (0.88) (0.28) (0.70) 
       
Period x Post 
Merger (𝛼6) 
0.855 0.101 -0.389 0.350 0.0386 0.411 
(1.71) (0.38) (-0.67) (1.35) (0.13) (1.08) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger x Period 
(𝛼7) 
0.441 -0.389 0.0270 -0.313 -0.116 -0.397 
(0.83) (-1.30) (0.05) (-1.04) (-0.31) (-1.05) 
       
Merger Effect -14.287** -4.233 -9.372* -5.124 -6.25 -5.45 
N 2,160 11,232 2,304 11,088 6,768 6,624 
R2 0.308 0.264 0.192 0.281 0.255 0.282 
Merger contests 15 78 16 77 47 46 
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With respect to industry relatedness, several papers have examined the effect of focused vs. 
diversified acquisition on the acquiring company’s abnormal stock returns (see, for example, 
Morck et al., 1990; Flanagan, 1996; Maquieira et al., 1998). However, the results of these 
studies are somewhat mixed and it has been unclear whether to pursue a diversified or a 
focused merger. Based on my results, a column (3) in Table 5, the diversified merger is 
associated with negative abnormal returns of approximately 9.37%, and the finding is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. It could be that there are fewer synergistic 
opportunities to be utilised after carrying out a diversified merger, and hence improving the 
competitive position of the combined company is more limited. This may be reflected in the 
long-term performance.  
The reason for underperformance could also imply that unrelated acquirers are more prone to 
overbidding when entered into a merger contest, as they may not be as well informed about 
the true value of the target as the related acquirers. Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy (2003) 
suggest that the presence of multiple bidders has a greater impact on tender offer premia, 
when the acquirer is not related to the target’s core-activities.  
When splitting the sample based on deal size (columns (5) and (6)), neither small nor large 
deals appear to have impact on the long-term post-merger performance. In Table 6 I report 
and base the results on transaction characteristics related to acquirer size, acquirer Tobin’s Q, 
and target size. The sample including only large acquirers underperform losers by 11.64% and 
the result is statistically significant at the 10% level. As Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and 
Harford and Li (2007) point out that equity-based payments, bonuses, and other 
compensations increase with the size of the company and, therefore managers have an 
incentive to carry out mergers simply to expand the company, regardless of whether or not it 
is an appropriate strategy from the company’s point of view. Thus, the negative merger effect 
linked to acquirer size could be related to managers’ misaligned personal objectives. With 
respect to other deal characteristic (columns (3) – (6)) I do not observe any statistically 
significant merger effect. 
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Table 6. Long-Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns – Bidder Characteristics 
 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is 
used as a proxy for the expected return. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which 
estimates the winner-loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the 
standard errors are clustered by contests. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets. The sample is divided in accordance with the acquirer size 
(columns (1) and (2)), acquirer’s Tobin’s Q (columns (3) and (4)), target size (columns (5) and (6)). 
 Market-adjusted BHARs 
 Acquirer size Acquirer’s Tobin’s Q Target size 
 
Large 
(1) 
Small 
(2) 
Large 
(3) 
Small 
(4) 
Large 
(5) 
Small 
(6) 
       
Winner (𝛼1) -12.05 -3.294 -17.91** 2.698 -1.595 -17.62* 
 (-1.46) (-0.42) (-2.15) (0.36) (-0.16) (-1.88) 
       
Period (𝛼2) -0.160 -0.214 -0.0984 -0.276 -0.228 -0.210 
 (-0.82) (-1.02) (-0.44) (-1.57) (-1.01) (-0.79) 
       
Winner x Period 
(𝛼3) 
0.152 0.0435 0.346 -0.155 -0.161 0.395 
(0.71) (0.19) (1.55) (-0.72) (-0.58) (1.65) 
       
Post Merger 
(𝛼4) 
11.43 -30.11* -2.423 -15.95 4.862 -4.708 
 (0.81) (-2.01) (-0.17) (-1.03) (0.37) (-0.24) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger (𝛼5) 
-7.589 22.58 29.01* -14.81 2.175 23.58 
(-0.53) (1.35) (1.75) (-1.07) (0.12) (1.20) 
       
Period x Post 
Merger (𝛼6) 
-0.114 0.566* -0.0213 0.472 0.0308 0.117 
(-0.34) (1.70) (-0.06) (1.54) (0.09) (0.27) 
       
Winner x Post 
Merger x Period 
(𝛼7) 
0.0766 -0.593 -0.770* 0.272 0.000229 -0.701 
(0.24) (-1.40) (-1.89) (0.83) (0.00) (-1.50) 
       
Merger Effect -11.635* 0.0516 -3.727 -8.029 -5.039 -4.743 
N 6,768 6,624 6,768 6,624 4,896 6,616 
R2 0.305 0.234 0.258 0.277 0.236 0.255 
Merger contests 47 46 47 46 34 39 
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4.4 Payment Method – Stock Deal vs. Cash Deal 
Malmendier et al. (2014) find that the acquirer underperformance three years after winning a 
long duration merger contest can be explained by the means of payment. The authors reason 
that if winners offer more stock-financing in long duration contests than in short duration, the 
winners’ poor performance in the long duration would be concentrated in stock-finance deals. 
Based on this, Malmendier et al. (2014) re-estimate the previously used piecewise linear 
regression, by adding the percentage offered in stock and a new set of interaction variables, 
leading to Equation (8). For comparability reasons, I follow their approach and run the re-
estimated regression. 
Table 7 presents a winner underperformance of 20.63% in relation to a contest loser for all 
cash deals, preceded by a long merger contest, in which the initial bids have been typically 
sweetened. Even though, the result is statistically significant at the 10% level, the sample size 
of seven merger contests is too small to draw conclusions on the matter. The sample size 
should have been at least ten merger contests so that conclusions on the matter could be made.  
As a point of comparison, Malmendier et al. (2014) state that the long-term performance 
associated with winners engaged in a long-duration merger contest is 97.95% worse than 
losers. The result is shown to be statistically significant at the 5% level. However, 
Malmendier et al. (2014) do not disclose how many merger contests they have in all-cash 
deals. With respect to all-stock deals I did not get significant results, similar to Malmendier et 
al. (2014). Thus, based on the results in Table 7, it cannot be concluded that either stock- or 
cash-financing would have an adverse effect on long-term post-merger performance.  
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Table 7. Payment method – Stock Deal vs. Cash Deal 
 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 1𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 2 𝑡 + 𝛼 3𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 6𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 7𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼 8𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼 9𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 10𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 +  𝛼 11𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 12𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼 13𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 14𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼 15𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 represents the percentage paid in stock. The buy-
and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid 
announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the market return (CRSP value-weighted index) is 
used as a proxy for the expected return. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which 
estimates the winner-loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the 
approach of Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the 
standard errors are clustered by contests. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets. The long- and short-duration subsamples are divided in 
accordance with the form of payment; all-cash (columns (1) and (2)), all-stock (columns (3) and (4)). 
 BHAR Market adjusted 
 All-cash All-stock 
 
Long-duration 
(1) 
Short-duration 
(2) 
Long-duration 
(3) 
Short-duration 
(4) 
     
Winner (𝛼1) -14.88 -3.553 -3.469 -3.553 
 (-1.09) (-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.30) 
     
Period (𝛼2) -0.293 -0.255 -0.328 -0.255 
 (-0.61) (-1.09) (-0.70) (-1.09) 
     
Winner x Period (𝛼3) 
0.459 0.0711 -0.491 0.0711 
(0.98) (0.30) (-0.53) (0.30) 
     
Post Merger (𝛼4) 14.98 -17.73 15.08 -17.73 
 (0.54) (-0.58) (0.56) (-0.58) 
     
Winner x Post Merger 
(𝛼5) 
20.59 -19.21 -32.77 -19.21 
(1.10) (-0.71) (-0.60) (-0.71) 
     
Period x Post Merger 
(𝛼6) 
0.0133 0.124 0.0501 0.124 
(0.02) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) 
     
Winner x Post Merger x 
Period (𝛼7) 
-1.212** 0.382 0.505 0.382 
(-2.50) (0.61) (0.35) (0.61) 
     
Merger Effect -20.634* -6.887 -35.751 -6.888 
N 936 792 1,728 864 
R2 0.398 0.236 0.362 0.405 
Merger contests 7 5 10 5 
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4.5 Robustness tests 
In this section, I check for robustness of the reported negative long-term abnormal 
performance of acquirers. At first I examine acquirers’ performance belonging to the long-
duration merger contest subsample by using calendar-time portfolio regressions: Fama-French 
three-factor model and Carhart four factor model. After that I investigate the results rerunning 
Equation (6), but this time I use industry returns as expected returns. Finally, I test if the 
underperformance is caused by the following deal characteristics: hostile attitude, target 
public status, industry relatedness, and size of the acquirer. 
4.5.1 Robustness of long term performance: Calendar-time portfolio regression 
The underperformance of winners documented using BHARs methodology (Table 3 and 
Figure 3) may be caused by cross-sectional dependent abnormal returns of the sample 
companies. To eliminate the problems associated with BHAR approach, I run Fama-French 
three-factor regression and Carhart four factor regression analyses with respect to monthly 
returns of a portfolio that is long in merger contest winners and short in contest losers in the 
long-duration subsample. Table 8 reports the results for Fama-French model showing that the 
long-short portfolio has a signiﬁcantly negative alpha of -0.35 percent per month (5% 
significance level). The merger effect is extracted by using the estimate of Malmendier et al. 
(2014): alpha x (36 + average contest duration). The results imply that a winner engaged in a 
long-duration merger contest underperform the contest loser by 18.11% over the time period 
between the beginning of the merger contest and three years after the completion of the 
merger. The merger effect is statistically significant at the 10% level and in line both with the 
magnitude and direction of the BHAR piecewise regression results presented in Table 3.  
I also report Carhart four factor regression results for the long-duration subsample in Table 8. 
The long-short portfolio alpha is significantly negative at 0.30 percent per month with a 
slightly lower statistical power. The merger effect in Carhart model is approximately 15% and 
it is also statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the merger effect reported by 
Carhart four factor model is smaller in magnitude compared to the three-factor model.  
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The calendar-time portfolio regressions are found to be robust to issues within the BHAR 
approach; hence they provide appropriate robustness checks. The results of the calendar-time 
portfolios show that the underperformance of acquirers relative to losers is significant and 
varies between 15% and 18% with respect to long-duration merger contests. Hence, the 
results of the robustness checks are in line with the BHAR result presented in Table 3, column 
(1). 
Table 8. Robustness Test – Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions 
 
The table presents Fama-French three factor and Carhart four factor calendar-time portfolio regressions for the 
long-duration contests. The portfolio is a zero investment portfolio that is long in the winning bidders and short 
in the losing bidders. The portfolios are equal weighted and rebalanced every calendar month to maintain equal 
weights. The portfolios are formed starting in February 1985: bidders are added to the portfolio in the beginning 
of the event contest and held till the 36 months has passed following the merger completion. The abnormal 
return estimation ends in March 2015. The month is dropped out from the time series if there is no firm return in 
a calendar month. Abnormal returns are estimated employing the following Fama-French three factor model and 
Carhart four factor model: 
 
𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑝𝑡 is the equal weighted long-short portfolio’s return in month t, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 denotes the one-month Treasury bill 
rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡  is the market return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  stands for the size factor, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is book-to-market factor, 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 is the 
average return on the two high prior return portfolios subtracted with the average return on the two low prior 
return portfolios over the past 12 months. Merger effect is presented in percentage and it is calculated as alpha x 
(36 + average contest duration). For the long-duration merger contests the average duration is 15.44 months. The 
coeﬃcients are estimated using OLS. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets. 
 Long-duration merger contests 
 Fama-French three factor model 
(1) 
Carhart four factor model 
(2) 
 
MktRf 0.0599 0.0426 
 (1.50) (1.04) 
   
SMB 0.0999* 0.101* 
 (1.77) (1.81) 
   
HML 0.0630 0.0401 
 (1.01) (0.63) 
   
Mom  -0.0664* 
  (-1.78) 
   
Alpha -0.00352** -0.00295* 
 (-2.06) (-1.70) 
Merger Effect -18.107* -15.175* 
N 330 330 
R2 0.019 0.031 
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4.5.2 Robustness test: Industry-adjusted abnormal returns  
I rerun the same Equation (6) employed in Table 3, but this time I use industry-adjusted 
abnormal returns, instead of using market-adjusted. The results in Table 9 report that the 
acquirer underperformance is no longer statistically significant when changing the benchmark 
returns to average industry returns, yet the direction still indicates underperformance. Hence, 
the findings are highly sensitive to methodology, and therefore it could be concluded that the 
market efficiency assumption holds. In accordance with Fama (1998), possible observed 
anomalies disappear when used different benchmarks for normal returns, and therefore the 
market efficiency survives the challenge from the literature when investigating long-term 
return anomalies.  
Next I investigate the robustness of the results reported previously regarding the deal 
characteristics. I split the sample in subgroups based on the deal characteristics, and rerun the 
piecewise linear regression for different subgroups, but this time I have replace market-
adjusted to industry-adjusted returns. Table 10 reports that the merger effect associated to the 
characteristics is not statistically significant after the change in expected return benchmark. In 
line with the previous robustness check, these results support the view of Fama (1998, p. 
284), “most long-term return anomalies can reasonably be attributed to chance”. 
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Table 9. Robustness Test – Long-Term Industry-Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the average industry returns are used as a proxy for 
the expected returns. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which estimates the winner-
loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the approach of 
Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the standard errors are 
clustered by contests. The column (4) represents the full sample, while columns (1), (2), and (3) stand for the 
three contest duration subsamples. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are provided in the brackets.  
 BHAR Industry-adjusted 
 
Long-duration 
(1) 
Medium-duration 
(2) 
Short-duration 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(4) 
     
Winner (𝛼1)     
 -6.187 20.49 -2.773 4.558 
 (-0.53) (1.53) (-0.28) (0.66) 
Period (𝛼2)     
 -0.814* 0.329 -0.203 -0.219 
 (-1.89) (1.45) (-0.85) (-1.16) 
Winner x Period 
(𝛼3) 
    
0.141 -0.742** 0.287 -0.139 
 (0.34) (-2.07) (0.98) (-0.65) 
Post Merger 
(𝛼4) 
    
 -39.81 0.405 15.11 -9.165 
 (-1.62) (0.02) (0.90) (-0.78) 
Winner x Post 
Merger (𝛼5) 
    
44.81 -16.07 -33.54 -0.193 
 (1.40) (-0.57) (-1.52) (-0.01) 
Period x Post 
Merger (𝛼6) 
    
1.339** -0.318 -0.258 0.269 
 (2.48) (-0.74) (-0.57) (0.94) 
Winner x Post 
Merger x Period 
(𝛼7) 
    
-1.374* 0.613 0.705 -0.0439 
Merger Effect -5.359 -0.0856 -1.579 -2.043 
N 4,608 4,896 3888 13,392 
R2 0.233 0.227 0.228 0.211 
Merger contests 32 34 27 93 
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Table 10. Robustness Test – Deal Characteristics 
This table presents the results for the following piecewise regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑡 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼6 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where the dependent variable 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the buy-and-hold abnormal returns + /- 3 years around a merger 
contest j for a bidder i in a month t. 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable, stating whether bidder i is a winner in a merger 
contest j. t is an event time variable and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  indicates whether or not a period t belongs to a post-merger 
period, while 𝑛𝑗 denotes the contest fixed effects. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are normalized to zero in 
the month preceding the start of the contest (the first bid announcement) and calculated as follows: 
                                                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 − ∏ (1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the return of the bidder i involved in a merger contest j during a period t. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents 
the expected return during the same period. In this regression the average industry returns are used as a proxy for 
the expected returns. The merger effect is reported on the bottom between two lines, which estimates the winner-
loser difference in the end of the sample period.  Merger effect is calculated following the approach of 
Malmendier et al. (2014): ?̂?1 + ?̂?5+ 35 (?̂?3 + ?̂?7). Wald test is used to get the p-values and the standard errors are 
clustered by contests. ***,**,*, indicates statistical significance at the  1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. t-
statistics are provided in the brackets. The sample is split in accordance with the hostile attitude (column (1)), 
private target (column (2)), diversified merger (column (3)), and large acquirer (column (4)). 
 BHAR Industry adjusted 
 
Hostile 
(1) 
Private target 
(2) 
Diversified 
(3) 
Large Acquirer 
(4) 
     
Winner (𝛼1) 6.251 16.91 10.74 3.818 
 (0.90) (1.37) (1.68) (0.48) 
     
Period (𝛼2) -0.262 -0.203 0.222 -0.0553 
 (-0.74) (-0.40) (1.02) (-0.32) 
     
Winner x Period 
(𝛼3) 
-0.297 -0.634 -0.261 -0.127 
(-0.87) (-0.99) (-1.29) (-0.58) 
     
Post Merger (𝛼4) -4.666 -49.01 -1.627 6.377 
 (-0.12) (-1.43) (-0.07) (0.50) 
     
Winner x Post 
Merger (𝛼5) 
10.61 -36.55 -5.302 2.992 
(0.36) (-1.18) (-0.20) (0.14) 
     
Period x Post 
Merger (𝛼6) 
0.200 0.972 -0.104 -0.0324 
(0.22) (1.40) (-0.22) (-0.10) 
     
Winner x Post 
Merger x Period 
(𝛼7) 
-0.700 0.908 -0.122 -0.0635 
(-0.83) (0.94) (-0.18) (-0.12) 
     
Merger Effect -18.0357 -10.034 -7.949 0.135 
N 1,440 2,160 2,304 6,768 
R2 0.363 0.188 0.209 0.211 
Merger contests 10 15 16 47 
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5 Discussion of the results 
In this section I discuss the empirical results of this thesis by comparing them to the findings 
of Malmendier et al. (2014), which served as a motivation for this study. I also critically 
evaluate the validity of the results of Malmendier et al. (2014) and consider issues related to 
their approach to detect long-term abnormal returns. In addition to linking the findings of this 
study to the paper of Malmendier et al. (2014), I also discuss contributions of this thesis to the 
broader financial literature. 
5.1 Comparing the results to those of Malmendier et al. 
This paper is motivated by the unconventional findings of Malmendier et al. (2014), and I 
have followed their approach to evaluate the validity of their results. Their novel approach to 
examine merger contests, when estimating long-term value impacts of mergers on the 
acquirers, is able to resolve some of the problems related to the unobservable characteristics 
of a company, present in the previous studies. However, it cannot be ruled out that there 
would not be any additional unobserved factors affecting stock returns. Furthermore, 
Malmendier et al. (2014) argue that that sample is limited to bidders having equal chance of 
winning pre-merger, but the researchers do not exclude deals with hostile attitude, even 
though hostile attitude is considered to decreased the probability of acquiring the target 
(Baker and Savasoglu, 2002). Including hostile deals in the sample could be related to an 
attempt not to cut down the sample size any more than necessary, and instead choose to 
control the deal attitude separately, like other identified observable characteristics. 
Accordingly, applying the approach of Malmendier et al. (2014) comes with a cost, as the 
sample size decreases significantly when exploiting data solely on merger contests. 
The time period used in this thesis is three years longer than that used by Malmendier et al. 
(2014). In addition, the sample size of 93 merger contest is six bidders larger than the sample 
used by Malmendier et al. (2014). Even though the time periods are overlapping in our 
papers, it is unclear which companies Malmendier et al. (2014) have included in their sample. 
Furthermore, to my knowledge the academics do not examine their data for extreme values, 
irrespective of their small sample size. On the contrary, I winsorized my data set by replacing 
the outliers with less extreme values.  
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The results reported in this thesis differ significantly from those presented by Malmendier et 
al. (2014). The dissimilarities between the results can be explained by the aforementioned 
differences in the sample and sample size. Thus, it appears that the findings are highly 
sensitive to the changes in the sample, which is expected considering the sample size. 
Malmendier et al. (2014) report that the contest winners underperform the losers by as much 
as 46.4% and 45.25% in the long-duration contests in terms of the market- and industry-
adjusted abnormal returns, respectively. The results of Malmendier et al. (2014) are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The acquirer underperformance reported in this thesis 
varies between 5.36% and 18.11% and is statistically highly sensitive to the expected return 
benchmark. The sample size employed by Malmendier et al. (2014) in the long-duration 
contest subsample is almost one third smaller than mine. In addition, Malmendier at al. (2014) 
report that the short-duration contest winners outperform the losers by 54.27% and 50.95%, in 
terms of market and industry adjusted abnormal returns. The outperformance is statistically 
significant at the 5 and 10% level, respectively. My results do not support the observed 
positive performance for winners engaged in the short-duration contests.  
With respect to the payment method, Malmendier et al. (2014) examine the long-duration 
subsample and find that financing the acquisition with cash is associated with a severe 
negative post-merger underperformance of 97.95% in relation to the contest losers. The result 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. Although, Malmendier et al. (2014) do not disclose 
how many merger contests they have in the combined all-cash and long-duration subsample. 
As a point of comparison, when conducting a similar regression I have only seven merger 
contests included in the corresponding subsample, on the basis of which I concluded that no 
decisive conclusion can be made regarding the impact of cash-financing on long-term post-
merger stock returns. 
5.2 Linking the results to the financial literature  
Long-term effects of a certain event are challenging to examine, because it is hard to measure 
the isolated effects of one event over a long period of time. Hence, performance and valuation 
effects caused by corporate acquisitions are difficult to observe directly, as benefits may be 
achieved after a longer period of time than the period under the scrutiny. Moreover, the 
observed performance effects may simply reflect changes in macro-economic events or trends 
(Malmendier et al., 2014). Models for testing long-run performance have proven to be highly 
sensitive to changes and to the selected expected return benchmark. This sensitiveness is 
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likely to explain the controversial results of the previous empirical studies regarding long-
term post-merger impact on the acquirers (see, e.g. Mandelker, 1974; Langetieg, 1978; 
Agrawal et al., 1992; Loderer and Martin, 1992; Mitchell and Stafford, 1997; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998; Savor and Lu, 2009; Malmendier et al,. 2014). 
Based on the empirical results reported in this thesis, the acquirers obtaining a target company 
after a long-lasting merger contest with at least one challenging bidder involved in a bidding 
war statistically underperform the unsuccessful challenging bidders by a range between 
15.18% and 18.11% in the long-term. This underperformance is statically significant at the 
10% level when using the calendar-time portfolios and the event-time methodology with 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. However, the underperformance is no longer 
statistically significant when changing the benchmark to average industry returns, yet the 
direction still indicates acquirer underperformance.  
The pattern is similar to the transaction characteristics first found to affect long-term 
abnormal acquirer return but when the benchmark for normal return is changed to industry 
return benchmark the results become insignificant. The previous studies, such as the paper of 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), have shown that long-run event studies are highly sensitive to the 
selection of normal returns, as any small error in calculations accumulates with the calculation 
period. Fama (1998 p.285) highlights that the bad model problem in long-term return studies 
is severe, because “bad model errors in expected returns grow faster with the return horizon 
than the volatility of returns.”  
Even though examining the market hypothesis is outside the scope of this thesis, it appears 
that it does hold, since no consistent long-term abnormal returns are detected. Following the 
Fama (1998) it could be stated the merger effect is up to pure chance, and the chance of 
observing underperformance is about as frequent as observing outperformance. According to 
Fama (1998, p. 284): “most long-term return anomalies can reasonably be attributed to 
chance”. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis I empirically examine whether mergers create or destroy acquirer value by 
employing a novel methodology similar to the one used by Malmendier et al. (2014) applied 
to a sample composed of U.S. merger contests including 93 acquirers and unsuccessful 
bidders. Malmendier et al. (2014) suggest that by examining merger contests it is possible to 
eliminate or reduce the omitted variable bias by using the contest losers’ performance as a 
counterfactual for how acquirers would have performed in the absence of the merger. 
Malmendier et al. (2014) reason that it is likely that merger contest winners are more similar 
to contest losers than they are to the average company in the market. The mergers included in 
the sample have been completed during the time period between 1985 and 2012. In assessing 
the long-term value impact, I employ both the event-time and calendar-time methodologies, 
and the improved benchmarks, contest losers, to detect long-term abnormal returns. 
Contrary to the results of Malmendier et al. (2014), I do not find evidence of consistent post-
merger acquirer value disruption. However, no long-term value creation is detected either. 
The reported results are robust across the following transaction characteristics identified by 
the prior literature: (i) payment method (cash or stock), (ii) industry relatedness (related or 
unrelated target), (iii) number of bidders, (iv) relative deal size, (v) deal attitude (hostile or 
friendly), (vi) acquirer size, (vii) acquirers’ Tobin’s Q, (viii) targets’ public status (private or 
public), and (ix) target size. However, it should be noted that even though the sample size 
used in this study is larger than that employed by Malmendier et al. (2014), it is still restricted 
and may have an impact on the results. Accordingly, applying the approach of Malmendier et 
al. (2014) comes with a cost, as the sample size decreases significantly when exploiting data 
solely on merger contests. 
The findings in this thesis also do not give support to the results of Malmendier et al. (2014) 
regarding the negative post-merger performance associated with cash-deals. My results are in 
line with the majority of the previous financial studies, documenting that, on average, cash 
deals are not value disruptive in terms of long-term abnormal performance. Moreover, I do 
not find evidence of stock-deals being value disruptive either, which is contrary to what is 
typically reported in the U.S. studies (see e.g. Asquith, 1983; Huang and Walking, 1987; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Dong et al., 2006). 
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To conclude, I do not find any reason why executives should avoid merger and acquisition 
activities. It also appears that, on average, the payment method does not affect the 
performance over long-term. Hence, cash- and stock-deals are equally justified and expanding 
inorganically is a sound strategy among other corporate strategies.  
Suggestions for further research  
In this study the performance of winners and losers is measured with abnormal stock returns, 
and thus no private acquirers or challenging private company bidders are included in the 
sample. Including private companies into the sample could be done by choosing another 
performance proxy than stock returns, e.g. one could investigate the change in profitability. 
As a result, all merger contests during the observation period could be taken into account and 
the issue with small sample size would also be mitigated. With respect to the observation 
period, it would be interesting to increase it to cover five years, and to check if the results 
remain unchanged. It could be the case that the three-year post-merger observation period is 
too short of a time for capturing positive integration synergies, such as revenue and cost 
synergies.  
The findings regarding the calendar-time portfolios are surprising and need further research, 
as they indicate that there could be an arbitrage opportunity associated with a portfolio that is 
short in the stocks of merger contest winners and long in the contest losers. However, the 
calendar-time portfolios are conducted so that only winners and losers that have been engaged 
in merger contests for at least ten months are included in the sample. Hence, knowing 
beforehand, at the time of the first bid announcement, whether the contested merger will last a 
long-period of time is impossible. Based on my results it is unclear, whether the arbitrage 
opportunity would exist immediately or some time after the merger competition would have 
ended. It could be that to exploit the arbitrage you would have to know the opportunity 
beforehand, but answering to this would need further research.  
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Appendix A: Terminology and definitions 
In this appendix I go through the key terminology and definitions related to mergers and 
acquisitions and to this thesis. 
Acquirer: a company acquiring another company  
BHAR: an abbreviation for buy-and-hold abnormal return 
Loser: an unsuccessful bidder unable to close the deal with the target, i.e. a loser in a merger 
contest. 
M&A: an abbreviation for mergers and acquisitions. 
Merger: strictly speaking, the concept of merger refers to a corporate transaction in which 
two companies are combined as equals. However, nowadays in most of the studies the 
concept stands for a general change of control in a company, and therefore I use the concepts 
of merger, acquisition, and takeover interchangeably. 
Merger/ bidding contest: refers to a contest for the control over a target company. In this 
context, participants in a merger contest have publicly announced their bids and have equal 
ex-ante chance of winning. 
Target: Refers to a company that potential acquirers are bidding for. 
White knight: an acquirer that purchases the target on the verge of being taken over by a 
hostile bidder. In white knight takeovers it is common that the current management stays in 
place.  
Winner: a successful bidder i.e. an acquirer, obtaining a target after winning a merger contest 
 
 
